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CHAPTER 6 
Adherence and Enforcement 
6.1 ADHERENCE TO THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
N ations adhere to the law of anned conflict not only because they are legally obliged to do so l but for the very practical reason that it is in their best 
interest to be governed by consistent and mutually acceptable rules of conduct. 2 
The law of anned conflict is effective to the extent that it is obeyed. Occasional 
violations do not substantially affect the validity of a rule oflaw, provided routine 
compliance, observance, and enforcement continue to be the nonn. However, 
repeated violations not responded to by protests, reprisals, or other enforcement 
actions may, over time, indicate that a particular rule is no longer regarded as 
valid. 
1. Under Conunon article 1, each nation has an affinnative duty at all times not only to respect 
the requirements of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, but also to ensure respect for them by its armed 
forces. Nicaragua Military Adivities Case, 1986 I.CJ. 114; 25 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1073 (para. 220) 
(holding this duty is a general principle of international law). Further, under GWS 1929, arts. 
28-30, & 49-54; GWS-Sea, arts. 50-53; GPW, arts. 129-132; GC, arts. 146-149 (and GP I, arts. 
85-87, for nations bound thereby-see Table A5-1 (p. 315)), every such nation has an obligation to 
seek out and cause to be prosecuted violators of the Geneva Conventions irrespective of their 
nationality, and to otherwise encourage compliance of the Conventions by any other country or its 
armed forces including those ofits allies. The United States supports the principle, detailed in GP I, 
arts. 85-89, that the appropriate authorities take all reasonable measures to prevent acts contrary to 
the applicable rules of humanitarian law. The Sixth Annual American Red· Cross-Washington 
College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary 
International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. U J. 
Int'l L. & Policy 428 (1987) (remarks of U.S. Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser 
Matheson). This self-interest is reflected in the following: 
Any govenunent which, while not itselfinvolved in a conflict, is in a position to exert 
a deterrent influence on a govenunent violating the laws of war, but refrains from 
doing so, shares the responsibility for the breaches. By fulling to react while able to do 
so, it fosters the process which could lead to its becoming the victim of similar 
breaches and no longer an accessory by omission. 
ICRC Appeal, 1985 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 33 & 289-90. 
As ofl November 1997, only Eritrea, the Marshall Islands and Nauru of the 185 U.N. members 
were not party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See Table AS-l (p. 315). 
2. Discipline in combat is essential. Violations of the law of armed conflict detract from the 
commander's ability to accomplish his mission. Violations of that law also have an adverse impact 
on national and world public opinion. Violations on occasion have served to prolong a conflict by 
inciting an opponent to continue resistance. 
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6.1.1 Adherence by the United States. The Constitution of the United 
States provides that treaties to which the U.S is a party constitute a part of the 
"supreme law of the land" with a force equal to that of law enacted by the 
Congress.3 Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently 
ruled that where there is no treaty and no controlling executive, legislative, or 
judicial precedent to the contrary, customary international law is a fundamental 
element of U.S. nationallaw.4 Since the law of armed conflict is based on 
international agreements to which the U.S. is a party and customary law, it is 
binding upon the United States, its citizens, and its armed forces.5 
6.1.2 Department of the Navy Policy. SECNAVINST 3300.1A states that 
the Department of the Navy will comply with the law of armed conflict in the 
conduct of military operations and related activities in armed conflicts.6 Article 
0705, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, provides that: 
2.( ... continued) 
Violations of commitments under the law of anned conflict can seriously hamper the willingness 
and political ability of allies to support military activities within and outside the alliance. This is 
particularly true of the United States and other nations with democratic forms of government. In 
contrast, dictatorships, depending primarily on the deployment of military forces, with total 
control ofinternal mass media and allowing no political dissent, may disregard legal commitments 
without equivalent impact on their overall political and strategic position. Our posture is 
strengthened by our continued respect for the law of anned conflict, while theirs may be 
strengthened in some cases by their willingness to disregard those laws for temporary tactical 
advantage. Therefore, an opponent's disregard of the law is not a sound basis for the United States 
to take a similar callous attitude. Rather, the sharper the distinction between our respect for the 
sensitivities and individuality of our allies, supported by our respect for the law, and our opponent's 
disregard of the interests of their allies and the law, the better for our overall posture. Compliance 
will also assure the U.S. of the moral high ground, maintain and enhance support from our allies, 
and foster sympathy for our cause among neutrals. In short, U.S. anned forces are committed to 
combat to protect fundamental values, not to abandon them. 
Accordingly, violations of the law by U.S. anned forces may have greater impact on American and 
world public opinion than would similar violations by our adversaries. See AFP 110-31, para. 1-6; 
Brittin, International Law for Seagoing Officers 227 (5th ed. 1986). 
3. U.S. Const., art. VI, d. 2. 
4. E.g., The Paquete Rahana, 175 U.S. 677, 20 S.Ct. 290, 299 (1900); Reidv. Covert, 354 U.S. 
1,18,77 S.Ct. 1222, 1231 (1957). See also 1 Restatement (Third), sec. 111, Reporters' Notes 2 & 
3, and Introductory Note. 
5. The law of anned conflict is part ofU .S.law which every servicemember has taken an oath 
to obey. This obligation is implemented for the armed forces in DOD Directive 5100.77, Subj: 
DOD Law of War Program, and the Unifonn Code of Military Justice. 
6. SECNAVINST 3300.1 (series), Subj: Law of Anned Conflict (Law of War) Program to 
Insure Compliance by the Naval Establishment, para. 4a. Similar directions have been 
promulgated by the operational chain of command, e.g., MJCS 0124-88, 4 August 1988, Subj: 
Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program; USCINCLANTINST 3300.3 (series), Subj: 
DOD Law ofWar Instruction; CINCPACFLTINST 3300.9 (series), Subj: Implementation of the 
DOD Law of War Program. 
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At all times, commanders shall observe, and require their commal!ds to observe, the principles 
of international law. Where necessary to fulfill this responsibility, a departure from other 
provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized? 
It is the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant 
of the Marine Corps (see OPNAVINST 3300.52 and MCO 3300.3) to ensure 
that: 
1. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps observe and enforce the law of anned 
conflict at all times. International anned conflicts are governed by the law of 
anned conflict as a matter oflaw. However, not all situations are "international" 
anned conflicts. In those circumstances when international anned conflict does 
not exist (e.g. internal anned conflicts), law of anned conflict principles may 
nevertheless be applied as a matter ofpolicy.8 
2. Alleged violations of the law of anned conflict, whether committed by or 
against United States or enemy personnel, are promptly reported, thoroughly 
investigated, and where appropriate, remedied by corrective action. 9 
7. Other arts. of U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, concerned with international law and with 
international relations in armed conflict, include: 
Article Title 
0406(5) Designation of Hospital Ships and Medical Aircraft 
0829 Prisoners of War 
0854 Hospital Ship or Medical Aircraft 
0912 Communication with Foreign Officials 
0914 Violations ofInternational Law and Treaties 
0920 Protection of Commerce of the United States 
0924 Medical or Dental Aid to Persons Not in the Naval Service 
0925 Assistance to Persons, Ships and Aircraft in Distress 
0939 Granting of Asylum and Temporary Refuge 
1063 Detail of Persons Performing Medical or Religious Services 
1135 Relations with Foreign Nations 
8. Para. 3a of the draft revision of DOD Directive 5100.77 (paragraph 6.1.1, note 5 (p. 324» 
provides: 
3. The Heads of the DOD Components shall: 
a. Ensure that the armed forces of the United States will comply with the law of 
war during armed conflict however such conflicts are characterized and with the 
principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations. 
9. Essential, therefore, is reporting of the facts by all persons with knowledge of suspected 
violations up the chain of command to the NCA. In the Department of the Navy, SECNA VINST 
3300.1 (series) requires the reporting of all suspected violations of the law of armed conflict. See 
Annex A6-1 (p. 359), replicating enclosure (2) to SECNAVINST 3300.1 (series), for an 
illustrative list of reportable violations. Arts. 87(1) and (3) ofGP I require State parties to require 
military commanders at all levels to report to competent authorities breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and GP I by or against members of the armed forces under their command and other 
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3. All service members of the Department of the Navy, commensurate with their 
duties and responsibilities, receive, through publications, instructions, training 
programs and exercises, training and education in the law of armed conflict.10 
Navy and Marine Corps judge advocates responsible for advising operational 
commanders are specially trained to provide officers in command with advice 
and assistance in the law of armed conflict on an independent and expeditious 
basis. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps 
have directed officers in command of the operating forces to ensure that their 
9.{ ... continued) 
persons under their control, to take the necessary steps to prevent violations, and where 
appropriate, to initiate disciplinary "or penal" action against the violators. The United States 
supports this principle as one that should be observed and in due course recognized as customary 
law. Matheson, Remarks, paragraph 6.1, note 1 (p. 323), at 422 & 428. 
10. SECNAVINST 3300.1 (series), para. 4b. OPNAVINST 3300.52, Subj: Law of Armed 
Conflict (Law of War) Program to Ensure Compliance by the U.S. Navy and Naval Reserve; and 
MCO 3300.3, Subj: Marine Corps Law of War Program, define, respectively, the U.S. Navy and 
U.S. Marine Corps law of anned conflict training programs. Annex A6-2 (p. 362) provides the 
fundamental rules for combatants, suitable for a basic training program. 
The law of anned conflict has long recognized that knowledge of the requirements of the law is a 
prerequisite to compliance with the law and to prevention of violations of its rules, and has 
therefore required training of the anned forces in this body of law. On dissemination, see Hague 
IV, art. 1; Hague X, art. 20; GWS 1929, art. 29; GWS, art 47; GWS-Sea, art. 48; GPW, art. 127; 
GC, art. 144; and for States party thereto, the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property, arts. 
7 & 25; GP I, arts. 83 & 87(2); GP II, art. 19; and the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention, 
art. 6. The United States supports the principle in GP I, art. 83, that study of the principles of the 
law of anned conflict be included in programs of military instruction. Matheson, Remarks, 
paragraph 6.1, note 1 (p. 323), at 428. See also Meyrowitz, The Function of the Laws of War in 
Peacetime, 1986 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 77; Hampson, Fighting by the Rules: Instructing the 
Armed Forces in Humanitarian Law, 1989 id. 111; Green, The Man in the Field and the Maxim 
IgnorantiaJuris Non Excusat, in Essays on the Modern Law of War 27 (1985). On legal advisers in 
anned forces, see GP I, art. 82; Parks, The Law of War Adviser, 31 JAG J. 1 (1980); Green, The 
Role of Legal Advisers in the Anned Forces, in Essays on the Modern Law ofW ar 73 (1985). The 
United States supports the principle of art. 82, that legal advisers be made available, when 
necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of these 
principles. Matheson, id., at 428.JAGINST 3300.1 (series), note 11 (p. 327), details the operational 
law billets identified for U.S. Navy judge advocates. On the duty of commanders, see GP I, art. 87. 
The manner of achieving these results is left to nations to implement. Various international bodies 
exist to assist, e.g., the ICRC, Henry Dunant Institute in Geneva Switzerland, International 
Institute of Humanitarian Law at San Remo Italy, the International Society of Military Law and 
the Law of War, and the International Committee of Military Medicine and Pharmacy. See de 
Mullinen, Law ofW ar Training Within Armed Forces: Twenty Years Experience, 1987 Int'l Rev. 
Red Cross 168. On the role of military manuals (such as this publication) in the dissemination of 
the law of anned conflict to military forces, see Reisman & Lietzau, Moving International Law 
from Theory to Practice: The Role of Military Manuals in Effectuating the Law of Armed 
Conflict, in Robertson at 1-7. 
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judge advocates have appropriate clearances and access to infonnation to enable 
h h ·bili· 11 t em to carry out t at responSl ty. 
6.1.3 Command Responsibility. Officers in command are not only 
responsible for ensuring that they conduct all combat operations in accordance 
with the law of armed conflict; they are also responsible for the proper 
performance of their subordinates. While a commander may delegate some or all 
of his authori!)T, he cannot delegate responsibility for the conduct of the forces he 
commands. 12 The fact that a commander did not order, authorize, or knowingly 
acquiesce in a violation of the law of armed conflict by a subordinate will not 
relieve him of responsibility for its occurrence ifit is established that he failed to 
exercise properly his command authority or failed otherwise to take reasonable 
di d . 1· h 13 measures to scover an correct VlO atlons t at may occur. 
11. OPNAVINST 3300.52, para. 4.k.2. See JAGINST 3300.1 (series), Subj: JAG Billets 
Requiring Special or Detailed Knowledge of the Law of Armed Conflict and Training Objectives 
for Navy Judge Advocates in Such Billets; and JAGINST 3300.2 (series), Subj: Law of Armed 
Conflict Resource Materials. The Army Judge Advocate General's School has developed a 
checklist for the review of operational plans to ensure compliance with the law of armed conflict, 
which is set forth in chap. 6 of the School's Operational Law Handbook. 
12. U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 0802.1. 
13. A commander at any level is personally responsible for the crilninal acts of warfare 
committed by a subordinate if the commander knew in advance of the breach about to be 
committed and had the ability to prevent it, but failed to take the appropriate action to do so. In 
determining the personal responsibility of the commander, the element of knowledge may be 
presumed if the commander had information which should have enabled him or her to conclude 
under the circumstances that such breach was to be expected. Officers in command are also 
personally responsible for unlawful acts of warfare performed by subordinates when such acts are 
committed by order, authorization, or acquiescence of a superior. Those facts will each be 
determined objectively. See Green, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Command 
Responsibility, Nav. War ColI. Rev., Spring 1997, 26-68; Levie, Command 
Responsibility, 8 USAFAJ. Leg. Stu. _ (1998) (forthcolning). 
Some lnilitary tribunals have held that, in suitable circumstances, the responsibility of commanding 
officers may be based upon the failure to acquire knowledge of the unlawful conduct of 
subordinates. In TIle Hostages Case, the United States Military Tribunal stated: 
Want of knowledge of the contents of reports made to him [i.e., to the commanding 
general] is not a defense. Reports to commanding generals are made for their special 
benefit. Any failure to acquaint themselves with the contents of such reports, or a 
failure to require additional reports where inadequacy appears on their face, 
constitutes a dereliction of duty which he cannot use in his own behal£ 
United States v. Wilhelm List et al., 9 TWC 127 (1950). 
The responsibility of commanding officers for unlawful conduct of subordinates has not been 
applied to isolated offenses against the laws of armed conflict, but only to offenses of considerable 
magnitude and duration. Even in the latter instances, the circumstances surrounding the 
comlnission of the unlawful acts have been given careful consideration: 
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6.1.4 Individual Responsibility. All members of the naval service have a duty 
to comply with the law of armed conflict and, to the utmost of their ability and 
authority, to prevent violations by others.14 They also have an affirmative 
13.( ... continued) 
It is absurd ... to consider a commander a murderer or rapist because one ofhis 
soldiers commits a murder or a rape. Nevertheless, where murder and rape and 
vicious, revengeful actions are wide-spread offences, and there is no effective 
attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such a 
commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawlessness ofhis 
troops, depending upon their nature and the circumstances surrounding them. 
Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 4 LRTWC 35 (t948). 
The responsibility of a commanding officer may be based solely upon inaction. Depending upon 
the circumstances of the case, it is not always necessary to prove that a superior actually knew of the 
offense committed by his subordinates ifit can be established that available information was such 
that he or she should have known. (GP I, art. 86, Failure to Act, confirms this rule.) See Parks, 
Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1973); Green, Essays on the Modem 
Law of War 225-37 (1985). See also Levie, at 421-9 for a general discussion of command 
responsibility, and at 156-63 for an analysis of the Yamashita trial. The Statute of the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, reprinted in 
32 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1192 (1993) [hereinafter "Statute of the International Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia"], art. 7, establishes individual criminal responsibility for "a person who planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or 
execution" of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the laws or customs of war, 
genocide or crimes against humanity. Art. 7(3) specifically provides: 
3. The fact that any of the acts ..... was committed by a subordinate does not relieve 
his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the 
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to 
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators thereo£ 
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 
1994, reprinted in 33 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1598 (1994) [hereinafter "Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda"] contains essentially identical language at art. 6(3). 
The Statute of the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda were adopted by the U.N. Security Council in U.N.S.C. 
Resolutions 827 (1993) (reprinted in 32 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1203 (1993» and 955 (1994) (reprinted in 33 
Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1598 (1994», respectively. 
14. Where U.S. personnel are involved, military personnel with supervisory authority have a 
duty to prevent criminal acts. Any person in the naval service who sees a criminal act about to be 
committed must act to prevent it to the utmost of his or her ability and to the extent ofhis or her 
authority. 10 U.S. Code sec. 5947; U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, arts. 1131 & 1137. Possible 
actions include moral arguments to dissuade, threatening to report the criminal act, repeating 
orders of superiors, stating personal disagreement, and asking the senior individual on scene to 
intervene as a means of preventing the criminal act. In the event the criminal act direcdy and 
imminendy endangers a person's life (including the life of another person lawfully under his or her 
(continued ... ) 
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obligation to report prompdy violations of which they become aware. Members 
of the naval service, like military members of all nations, must obey readily and 
stricdy all lawful orders issued by a superior. 15 Under both international law and 
U.S. law, an order16 to commit an obviously criminal act, such as the wanton 
killing of a noncombatant or the torture of a prisoner, is an unlawful order and 
will not relieve a subordinate of his responsibility to comply with the law of 
armed conflict. Only if the unlawfulness of an order is not known by the 
individual, and he could not reasonably be expected under the circumstances to 
recognize the order as unlawful, will the defense of obedience to an order protect 
a subordinate from the consequences of violation of the law of armed conflict. 17 
6.2 ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
Various means are available to belligerents under international law for 
inducing compliance with the law of armed conflict. To establish the facts, the 
belligerents may agree to an ad hoc inquiry. 18 In the event of a clearly established 
violation of the law of armed conflict, the aggrieved nation may: 19 
14.( ... continued) 
custody), force may be used to the extent necessary to prevent the crime. However, the use of 
deadly force is rarely justified; it may be used only to protect life and only under conditions of 
extreme necessity as a last resort when lesser means are clearly inadequate to protect life. Compare 
SECNAVINST 5500.29 (series), Subj: Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by 
Personnel of the Department of the Navy in Conjunction with Law Enforcement, Security Duties, 
and Personal Protection; OPNAVINST 3120.32 (series), Subj: Standard Organization and 
Regulations of the U.S. Navy, art. 412b, circumstances under which a weapon may be fired; and 
OPNAVINST C5510.83 (series), Subj: Navy Nuclear Weapons Security Manual. 
15. U. S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 1132 and UCMj, arts. 90-92, delineate offenses 
involving disobedience of lawful orders. Both SECNA VINST 3300.1 (series) and OPNAVINST 
3300.52 (see paragraph 6.1.2, note 11 (p. 327» are drafted as lawful general orders. See paragraph 
6.2.5.5.1 (p.355). 
16. The order may be direct or indirect, explicit or implied. 
17. See paragraph 6.2.5.5.1 (p. 355) for a further discussion of the defense of superior orders. 
War crimes trials are discussed in paragraphs 6.2.5.1 (p. 350) and 6.2.5.2 (p. 351). 
18. The Geneva Conventions have long authorized and encouraged belligerents to agree to 
objective enquiries into alleged violations of those Conventions. GWS 1929, art. 30; GWS, art. 52; 
GWS-Sea, art. 53; GPW, art. 132; GC, art. 149. (See paragraph 6.1.2 (p. 324) regarding national 
requirements to investigate alleged violations of the law of armed conflict.) No such ad hoc 
agreement has ever been concluded, in large measure because of mutual suspicions and hostilities. 
The United Nations has established a team of experts to investigate allegations of such violations. See, 
e.g., Prisoners ofWar in Iran and Iraq: The Report of a Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General, 
january 1985, U.N. Doc. S/16962, 22 Feb. 1985; and Report of Group of Experts to Investigate 
Reports of the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, U.N. Doc. S/19823, 25 Apr. 1988, which led to 
vigorous condemnation of their use, albeit without assigning responsibility to one side, in Security 
Council Resolution 612,9 May 1988, Dep'tSt. Bull.,july 1988, at 69. See also U.N. GeneralAssembly 
Resolution 46/59 (1991), Declaration on Fact-Finding by the United Nations in the Field of the 
Maintenance ofIntemational Peace and Security, 31 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 235 (1992). 
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1. Publicize the facts with a view toward influencing world public opinion against 
th a:: di . 20 e Ollen ng natIon 
18.( ... continued) 
An International Fact-Finding Commission has been established under GP I, article 90. See 1991 
Int'l Rev. Red Cross 208-09, 411-12. By 15 October 1997, 50 nations had accepted the 
competence of the Commission, including the European neutrals (Austria, Finland, Sweden and 
Switzerland), and ten NATO countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain), Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Australia and New 
Zealand. The Commission cannot act without the consent of the parties to the dispute, which can 
be given either on a permanent one-time basis or an ad hoc basis for a particular dispute. The 
members of the Commission, elected in mid-March 1992, may be found in ICRC Bulletin, April 
1992, at 4. The fact that the former-Soviet Union (prior to its acceptance of the Commission's 
competence on 29 September 1989), and its allies and clients, were most reluctant to permit 
third-party supervision of the Geneva Conventions was another factorin the United States' refusal 
to seek ratification ofGP I. Sofaer, Remarks, 2 Am. UJ. Int'l L. & Policy 470. 
Belligerents not party to GP I, or States party to GP I which have not accepted the competence of 
the Fact Finding Commission, may request the Commission to investigate allegations of grave 
breaches or serious violations of the Convention. Bothe, Partsch & Solf at 543-44; Krill, The 
International Fact-Finding Commission-The Role of the ICRC, 1991 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 
190, at 197; Roach, The International Fact-Finding Commission, id. at 176. See also Kalshoven, 
Noncombatant Persons, in Robertson at 306-07. 
19. See Sachariew, States' Entitlement to Take Action to Enforce International Humanitarian 
Law, 1989 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 177. 
Commanders are not usually required to make the policy decision as to the appropriate use of one 
or more of the remedial actions set forth in the text, although there are exceptional situations in 
which even junior commanders may be required to make protests and demands addressed directly 
to the commander of offending forces. It is also apparent that a government decision cannot be 
made intelligently unless all officers upon whom the responsibility for decision rests understand the 
available remedial actions and report promptly to higher authority those circumstances which may 
justify their use. 
20. Experience in the Southeast Asia conflict amply demonstrates the particular effectiveness 
of television in affecting knowledge of and popular (home) support for U.S. forces. Summers, 
Western Media and Recent Wars, Mil. Rev., May 1986, at 4; Mitchell, Television and the 
Vietnam War, Nav. WarColl. Rev., May-June 1984, at42; Rinaldo, The Tenth Principle ofWar: 
Information, Mil. Rev., Oct. 1987, at 55; Walker, Truth is the Best Propaganda: A Study in 
Military Psychological Operations, National Guard Mag., Oct. 1987, at 26; Paddock, 
Psychological Operations, Special Operations, and US Strategy, in Special Operations in US 
Strategy 229 (Barnett, Tovar & Shultz eds. 1984). For the role of the media during Operations 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, see Shell, A Portrait of Pentagon's Media Strategy, Public 
RelationsJ.,June 1991, at 9-11; Zoglin, It Was a Public Relations Rout, Too, Time, March 11, 
1991, at 56-57; Holland, Put the Brass on the Tube, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., April 1991, at 48; 
Watson, The Issue of Media Access to Information, in Military Lessons of the Gulf War 202-11 
(1991); Smith, How CNN Fought the War (1991); Arnett, Live From Baghdad (1992). 
During Iraq's unlawful occupation of Kuwait, the Security Council invited all States to "collate 
substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them on the grave breaches by Iraq ... 
and to make this information available to the Council." U.N.S.C. Res. 674, 29 Oct. 1990, reprinted 
in U.S. Dep't of State, Dispatch, 5 Nov. 1990, at 239-40. For a report submitted by the U.S. 
pursuant to Resolution 674, see U.N. Doc. S121987, 7 Dec. 1990 (USA). See also U.N. Docs. 
S122535 and S122536, 29 April 1991 (reports of the Secretary-General). 
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2. Protest to the offending nation and demand that those responsible be punished 
and/or that compensation be paid21 
20.( ... continued) 
Additionally, private individuals and nongovernmental organizations can be expected to attempt 
to ascertain and publicize the facts pertaining to alleged violations of the Conventions. Other 
organizations that have provided supervision of the application of the law of armed conflict 
include, among others, Amnesty International, Commission Medico-Juridique de Monaco, 
Human Rights Watch, ICRC, International Commission ofJurists, International Committee of 
Military Medicine and Pharmacy, International Law Association and the World Veterans 
Federation. All of these organizations have been effective in bringing private and public pressure to 
bear on governments regarding the conduct of their armed forces in armed conflicts. 
21. Such protest and demand for punishment may be communicated directly to an offending 
belligerent or to the commander of the offending forces. On the other hand, an offended 
belligerent may choose to forward its complaints through a Protecting Power, a humanitarian 
organization acting in the capacity of a Protecting Power, or any nation not participating in the 
armed conflict. 
Hague IV, art. 3, states: 
A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said [Hague] Regulations 
shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all 
acts committed by persons forming part ofits armed forces. 
See Affaire des Biens Britannique au Maroc Espagnol (Spain v. U.S.), Report III (Oct. 23, 1924), at 2 
UNRIAA 645 (1949) and Kalshoven, State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed Forces, 
40 I.C.L.Q. 827 (1991). It is now generally established that the principle laid down in art. 3 is 
applicable to the violation of any rule regulating the conduct of hostilities and not merely to 
violations of the Hague Regulations. See Sandoz, Unlawful Damage in Armed Conflicts and 
Redress Under International Humanitarian Law, 1982 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 131,136-137. This 
customary rule is repeated in GP I, art. 91, and is discussed in useful detail in ICRC, Commentary 
1053-58. For an excellent discussion of State responsibility and reparations for violations of the law 
of armed conflict pertaining to environmental damage, see Greenwood, State Responsibility and 
Civil Liability for Environmental Damage Caused by Military Operations, in Grunawalt, King & 
McClain at 397-415; and Green, State Responsibility and Civil Reparation for Environmental 
Damage, in id. at 416-39. 
Recent demands for compensation involving U.S. forces include the following: 
Iraq agreed to give compensation for "the loss of life, personal injuries and. material 
damages" resulting from the attack on USS STARK on 17 May 1987. Exchange of Notes, 20 & 21 
May 1987, 26 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1427-28 (1987). Detailed claims for the wrongful deaths were 
submitted to Iraq in April 1988, Dep't St. Bull., Oct. 1988, at 59; Iraq paid $27.3 million, Dep't St. 
Bull., May 1989, at 67; 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 644, 83 Am.]. Int'l L. 561 (1989). 
For almost two hours on 8 June 1967, Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats attacked USS 
LffiERTY (AGTR-5) on the high seas of the Mediterranean about 15 NM west of the Gazasttip, 
just as Israel was concluding the Six-Day War. On 27 May 1968, Israel paid the United States 
$3,323,500, the full amount of compensation claimed on behalf of the 34 U.S. Navy men killed in 
the attack. Dep't St. Bull., 17 June 1968, at 799. On 28 April 1969, Israel paid $3,566,457 in 
settlement of the United States' claims on behalf of the additional 171 U.S. Navy members 
wounded in the attack. Dep'tSt.Bull., 2June 1969, at 473. On 17 December 1980, Israel agreed to 
pay $6 million, in three installments, for its damages to LffiERTY (albeit without conceding 
liability). 32 U.S.T. 4434, T.I.A.S. 9957; 1980 Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law 
747-48. The factual and legal issues of the attack are carefully examined in Jacobsen, AJuridical 
Examination of the Israeli Attack on the USS Uberty, 36 Nav. L. Rev. 1 (1986). 
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3. Seek the intervention of a neutral party, particularly with respect to the 
protection of prisoners of war and other of its nationals that have fallen under the 
control of the offending nation 22 
21.( ... continued) 
On 11 July 1988, the United States offered to compensate ex gratia the families of those lost 
in the downing ofIranian Airbus flight 655 on 3 July 1988. 24 Weekly Compo Pres. Docs. 912 (18 
July 1988). See Friedman, The Vincennes Incident, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., May 1989, at 72-79, and 
Agora: The Downing ofIran Air Flight 655,83 Am.]. Int'l L. 318-41 (1989). The ICAO report of 
investigation and ICAO Council actions are reproduced in 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 896 (1989). Iran's application 
against the United States before the I.CJ. appears at28 id. 842. See also 83 Am.]. Int'l L. 912-13 (1989). 
On 25 October 1983, at a time when the People's Revolutionary Army of Grenada was 
using a group of buildings inside Fort Matthew, St. George's, Grenada, as a military command post 
143 feet away from the Richmond Hill Insane Asylum, a bomb from a Navy A-7 aircraft 
accidentally struck the Asylum, killing sixteen patients and injuring six. A complaint against the 
United States was deemed admissible by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. See 
Weissbrodt & Andrus, The Right to Life During Armed Conflict: Disabled Peoples' International 
V. United States, 29 Harv. Int'l L.J. 59 (1988). The claim was subsequendy withdrawn. While the 
U.S. Agency for International Development provided ex gratia compensation to individual victims 
and to rebuild the hospital, the U.S. maintained that it had no legal obligation to do so since its 
actions were in compliance with the law of armed conflict. Ridlmond HnI V. United States, Case 
9213, Report No. 3/96, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser. LlV /11.91 Doc. 7 at 201 (1996). See also 
paragraph 8.1.2.1 (p. 404) regarding incidental injury and collateral damage. 
See also the Japanese acceptance of responsibility for the 12 December 1937 sinking in the 
Yangtze River of the U.S. gunboat USS PANAY by Japanese aircraft (38 U.S. Naval War 
College, International Law Situations, with Situations and Notes, 1938, at 129-50 (1940); 
Swanson, The Panay Incident: Prelude to Pearl Harbor, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Dec. 1967, at 26, 
and the United States acceptance of responsibility for the sinking on 1 April 1945 of the Japanese 
passenger-cargo vessel A WA MARU on a voyage in which she had been given assurances of safe 
passage, Agreement and Agreed Terms of Understanding on the Setdement pf Awa Mam Claim, 
Tokyo, 14 April 1949, 9 Bevans 467. 
During the course of the afternoon of 8 June 1982, near the end of the Falklands/Malvinas 
war, the Liberian flag tanker HERCULES, in ballast, was attacked three times by Argentinian 
military aircraft about 600 miles east of Argentina and nearly 500 miles from the Falklands in the 
South Adantic. The bombing and rocket attacks damaged her decks and hull and lefr one 
undetonated bomb lodged in her starboard side. The o' mers decided it was too dangerous to attempt 
to remove this bomb and had her scutded 250 NM off the Brazilian coast. The vessel owner and time 
charter sued Argentina in U.S. Federal District Court which held that under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.c. sec. 1330, 1602-1611, the District Court did not have 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. V. Algentine Republic, 638 F. 
Supp. 73 (S.D.N. Y. 1986). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the facts alleged, if proven, 
would constitute clear violations ofintemationallaw (e.g., 1958 High Seas Convention, Hague XIII) 
cognizable under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.s.C. sec. 1350, which the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act did not change. 830 F.2d 421, 26 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1375 (2d Cir. 1987), discussed in 
Recent Developments, 28 Va.]. Int'l L. 221 (1988) and Morris, Sovereign Immunity for Military 
Activities on the High Seas: Amerada Hess v. Argentine Republic, 23 Int'l Lawyer 213 (1989). The 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding the FSIA provides the sole basis for obtainingjurisdiction 
over a foreign nation in U.S. courts, and the District Court correcdy dismissed the action, 109 S.C. 
683,57 U.S.L.W. 4121, 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'is 382 (1989), 83 Am.]. Int'l L. 565 (1989). 
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4. Execute a belligerent reprisal action (see paragraph 6.2.3)23 
5. Pullish individual offenders either during the conflict or upon cessation of 
h tili·· 24 os tles. 
6.2.1 The Protecting Power. Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the 
treatment of prisoners of war, interned civilians, and the inhabitants of occupied 
territory is to be monitored by a neutral nation known as the Protecting 
Power.25 Due to the difficulty of finding a nation which the opposing 
21.( ... continued) 
In para. 13 of Resolution 669 (1990), the U.N. Security Council reaffinned that Iraq is 
"liable under the [Fourth Geneva] Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as 
are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches." U.S. Dep't of State 
Dispatch, 1 Oct. 1990, at 129. By para. 8 of Resolution 674 (1990), the U.N. Security Council 
reminded Iraq of its liability under international law for "any loss, damage or injury arising in 
regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion 
and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq." Id., 5 Nov. 1990, at 240. See also U.N.S.C. Resolution 
687 (1991) reprinted in 30 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 846 (1991), which established a compensation 
commission to administer a fund from which claims against Iraq would be paid. 
22. See, e.g., Report of the Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General on the Situation of 
Prisoners of War in the Islamic Republic ofIran and Iraq, U.N. Doc. S/20147, 24 Aug. 1988. 
Diplomatic pressure applied through neuttal States or through international organizations has 
become a major factor in enforcing the law of armed conflict. During the Southeast Asia conflict, 
for example, the United States conducted a successful diplomatic effort through neuttal States to 
prevent political "show trials" of our prisoners of war. Levie, Maltteattnent of Prisoners ofW ar in 
Vietnam, 48 Boston U.L. Rev. 323, 344-45 (1968), reprinted in 2 The Vietnam War and 
International Law 361, 382-83 (Falk ed. 1969). Accurate, thorough investigation of enemy 
violations gready help in pursuing such diplomatic activity. See paragraph 6.2, note 18 (p. 329). 
23. See paragraph 6.2.3 (p. 335). 
24. See paragraph 6.2.5 (p. 343). 
25. GWS, art. 8; GWS-Sea, art. 8; GPW, art. 8, GC, art. 9; GP I, arts. 2(c} & 5; de Preux, 
Synopsis I: Protecting Power, 1985 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 86. The United States sttongly supports 
the principle that Protecting Powers be designated and accepted without delay from the beginning 
of any conflict. Matheson, Remarks, paragraph 6.1, note 1 (p. 323), at 428-29. That principle is 
contained in GP I, art. 5, but not unequivocally, and is still subject, in the last instance, to refusal by 
the nation in question.Id. The United States thus fulled to obtain one of its "basic objectives" in the 
negotiations that produced art. 5. Sofaer, Remarks, paragraph 6.2, note 18 (p. 330), at 469-70. 
Prior to its entty into World War II, the United States acted as protecting power for British 
prisoners of war in Europe. Subsequendy, the Swiss assumed this duty for both the United States 
and Great Britain. Since World War II, the protecting power system has not worked well because 
some countries refuse to pennit on-site inspection. There was no protecting power for U.S. 
prisoners of war during the conflicts in Korea, Southeast Asia, or Kuwait/Iraq. In fact, since 1949, a 
Protecting Power (Switzerland) was appointed only in the following cases: the Suez conflict in 
1956, the Goa conflict in 1961 and the war between India and Pakistan in 1971-1972 (although in 
the latter case the mandate of Switzerland was not understood in the same way by both parties). 
Hay, The ICRC and International Humanitarian Issues, 1984 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 3,5. During 
the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, Switzerland and Brazil, although not formally appointed as 
Protecting Powers for the United Kingdom and Argentina respectively, exercised functions of an 
intermediary and communicated infonnation. Junod, Protection of the Victims of Armed 
Conflict, Falkland-Malvinas Islands (1982), at 20 (1984); ICRC, Commentary 77 n.2. 
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belligerents will regard as truly neutral, international humanitarian 
organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, have been 
authorized by the parties to the conflict to perfonn at least some of the functions 
of a Protecting Power.26 
6.2.2 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The 
ICRC is a private, nongovernmental, humanitarian organization based in 
Geneva, Switzerland. The ruling body of the ICRC is comlosed entirely of 
Swiss citizens and is staffed mainly by Swiss nationals.2 (The ICRC is 
distinct from and should not be confused with the various national Red Cross 
societies such as the American National Red Cross.)28 Its principal pu~ose is 
to provide protection and assistance to the victims of anned conflict. 9 The 
Geneva Conventions recognize the special status of the ICRC and have 
assigned specific tasks for it to perfonn, including visiting and interviewing 
prisoners of war,30 providing relief to the civilian population of occupied 
26. The Conventions allow the ICRC to perform some duties of the Protecting Power if such 
a power cannot be found and if the detaining power allows it to so act. GWS, art. 10; GWS-Sea, art. 
10; GPW, art. 10; GC, art. 11; GP I, art. 5; see Peirce, Humanitarian Protection for the Victims of 
War: The System of Protecting Powers and the Role of the ICRC, 90 Mil. L. Rev. 89 (1980). 
In Korea and in Southeast Asia, for example, the I CRC acted in its traditional humanitarian role for 
North Korean, Chinese, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese prisoners in the hands of the United 
States and its allies notwithstanding refusal by North Korea and North Vietnam to provide ICRC 
access to prisoners in their hands. Levie, Maltreatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam, 48 Boston 
U. L. Rev. 323 (1968), reprinted in Schmitt & Green at chap. V; Levie, 2 Code oflnternational 
Armed Conflict 312; The International Committee and the Vietnam Conflict, 1966 Int'l Rev. 
Red Cross 399; Activities of the ICRC in Indochina from 1965 to 1972, 1973 Int'l Rev. Red 
Cross 27. 
The ICRC also visited Iraqi POWs held by Coalition Forces in Saudi Arabia during the GulfWar. 
Iraq, however, refused ICRC access to Coalition POWs held in Iraq. ICRC Bulletin, March 1991, 
at 2. 
27. Given the increase in the number of situations in which the ICRC is being called upon to 
act, it is becoming common for the I CRC to appoint non-Swiss nationals as post and field officers. 
28. Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, arts. 1 & 5 (1986), 
reprinted in 1987 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 29, 32. The ICRC bases its activities on the principles of 
neutrality and hurnanity, and is part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 
Some national Red Cross societies are under government control. 
29. Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, art. 5(2) (d) (1986), 
1987 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 33. See While & Raymer, A Litde Humanity: the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 170 National Geographic, November 1986, at 647-79. 
The ICRC's responsibility to endeavor to ensure the protection of victims extends not only to 
international and non-international armed conflicts and their direct results, but also to internal strife. 
Red Cross Movement Statute, art. 5(2)(d). Art. 5 also tasks the ICRC with a number of other functions. 
30. The ICRC is also authorized to visit and interview detained or interned civilians in 
international armed conflicts. All such interviews must be without witnesses present. GPW, art. 
126; GC, arts. 30(3), 76(6), 126 & 143(2). 
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. . 31 hi fc . fc· .. . 32 d temtones, searc ng or m ormatlon concermng nnssmg persons, an 
offerin~ its "good offices" to facilitate the establishment of hospital and safety 
zones. 3 Under its governing statute, the ICRC is dedicated to work for the 
faithful application of the Geneva Conventions, to endeavor to ensure the 
protection of military and civilian victims of armed conflict, and to serve as a 
neutral intermediary between belligerents.34 
6.2.3 Reprisal. A reprisal is an enforcement measure under the law of armed 
conflict consisting of an act which would otherwise be unlawful but which is 
31. GC, arts. 59, 61 & 142. 
32. GPW, art. 123, and GC, art. 140; GP I, art. 33, for State parties thereto. The ICRC is also 
responsible under these articles for transmitting £unily messages to PWs and interned civilians. 
33. GWS, art. 23(3); GC, art. 14(3). The ICRC is also entitled to receive requests for aid from 
protected persons (GC art. 30) and to exercise its right of initiative (Red Cross Movement Statute, 
art. 5(3». The ICRC may ask the parties to a conflict to agree to its discharging other humanitarian 
functions in the event of non-international anned conflicts (common article 3) and international 
anned conflicts (GWS, art. 9; GWS-Sea, art. 9; GPW, art. 9; GC, art. 10). Hay, paragraph 6.2.1, 
note 25 (p. 333) at 6. The ICRC is now also authorized to act in cases of internal strife. Red Cross 
Movement Statute, art. 5(2)(d). 
34. The 1986 Red Cross Movement Statute (art. 5(2)(c» expanded the ICRC's mandate to 
include working for the "faithful application of international humanitarian law applicable in anned 
conflicts." See Forsythe, Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross, 12 
Human Rights Q. 265 (1990). 
The ICRC has defined "international humanitarian law applicable in anned conflicts" as: 
[I]nternational rules, established by treaties or custom, which are specifically 
intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from international or 
noninternational anned conflicts and which, for humanitarian reasons, limit the right 
of parties to a conflict to use the methods and means of warfare of their choice or 
protect persons and property that are, or may be, affected by conflict. The expression 
"international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts" is often abbreviated 
to "international humanitarian law" or "humanitarian law." 
1981 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 76. 
These rules are derived from the Law of the Hague and the Law of Geneva. The Law of the Hague 
deals principally with weapons and methods of warfare and was codified by the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Peace Conferences. The law relating to the protection of war victims has been contained in 
the various Geneva Conventions (of1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949). The two traditions (Hague and 
Geneva) have been somewhat merged in GP I, since Part III ofGP I deals with methods and means 
of warfare. As a result, a new tenn, "rules ofinternationallaw applicable in anned conflict," was 
introduced by GP I to encompass "the rules applicable in anned conflict set forth in international 
agreements to which the Parties to the conflict are Parties and the generally recognized principles 
and rules of international law applicable in armed conflict" (GP I, art. 2(b». Although this tenn has 
substantially the same meaning as the ICRC's terms, the ICRC's role does not extend to 
supervision of the conduct of hostilities. 
The ICRC has issued the following internal guidelines to govern its activities in the event of 
breaches of the law: 
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34.( ... continued) 
1. Steps taken by the JCRC on its own initiative 
General rule: The ICRC shall take all appropriate steps to put an end to violations of 
international humanitarian law or to prevent the occurrence of such violations. These 
steps may be taken at various levels according to the gravity of the breaches involved. 
However, they are subject to the following conditions: 
Cotifidential dlaracter ofsteps taken: In principle these steps will remain confidential. 
Public statements: The ICRC reserves the right to make public statements 
concerning violations ofinternational humanitarian law if the following conditions 
are fulfilled: 
- the violations are major and repeated; 
- the steps taken confidentially have not succeeded in putting an end to the violations; 
- such publicity is in the interest of the persons or populations affected or threatened; 
- the ICRC delegates have witnessed the violations with their own eyes, or the 
existence and extent of those breaches were established by reliable and verifiable 
sources .... 
1981 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 81-83. 
The I CRC made overt representations regarding the Iran-Iraq War. See 1983 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 
220-22 (press release of 11 May 1983 describing appeal of7 May 1983 to the nations party to the 
Geneva Conventions); 1984 id. 113-15 (press release of 15 Feb. 1984 regarding appeal to 
governments of10 Feb. 1984); 1984 id. 357-58 (press release describing appeal to governments of 
24 Nov. 1984). The ICRC issued a press release regarding misuse of the Red Cross emblem in 
Lebanon, 1985 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 316-17; a press release regarding the Mghan Conflict on 20 
May 1984, 1985 id. 239-40; and a press release (no. 1705) regarding the escalation of fighting in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina on 10 April 1992. 
The ICRC Guidelines provide: 
Special rule: The ICRC does not as a rule express any views on the use of arms or 
methods of warfare. It may, however, take steps and, if need be, make a public 
statement ifit considers that the use or the threat to make use of a weapon or method 
of warfare gives rise to an exceptionally grave situation. 
Such situations arose during the course of the Iran-Iraq War. ICRC, Annual Report 1984, at 60-61 
(7 March 1984 report on the use of prohibited weapons, and 7 June 1984 press release on the 
bombing ofIraqi and Iranian cities); 1987 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 217 (appeal of 11 Feb. 1987 
regarding bombing of cities); ICRC Bull., April 1988, at 4 (10 March 1988 press release protesting 
against bombing of cities, and 23 March 1988 press release condemning use of chemical weapons in 
the province ofSulaymaniyah). 
For the appeals and notes verbale issued by the ICRC to the parties to the Persian Gulf Conflict, see 
1990 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 444,1991 id. 22-30 and 211-14. 
The ICRC Guidelines continue: 
2. Reception and transmission of complaints 
Legal basis: In conformity with article 6(4) of the Statutes of the International Red 
Cross, the ICRC is entided to take cognizance of "complaints regarding alleged 
breaches of the humanitarian Conventions". 
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34.( ... continued) 
Complaints from a party to a ronfiict or from the National Sodety of a party to a ronfiict: The 
ICRC shall not transmit to a party to a conflict (or to its National Red Cross or Red 
Crescent Society) the complaints raised by another party to that conflict (or by its 
National Society) unless there is no other means of communication and, 
consequently, a neutral intermediary is required between them. 
Complaints from third parties: Complaints from third parties (govemments, National 
Societies, govemmental or nongovernmental organizations, individual persons) shall 
not be transmitted. 
If the ICRC has already taken action concerning a complaint it shall inform the 
complainant inasmuch as it is possible to do so. If no action has been taken, the ICRC 
may take the complaint into consideration in its subsequent steps, provided that the 
violation has been recorded by its delegates or is common knowledge, and insofar as 
it is advisable in the interest of the victims. 
The authors of such complaints may be invited to submit them directly to the 
parties in conflict. 
Publidty given to rom plaints received: As a general rule the ICRC does not make public 
the complaints it receives. It may publicly confirm the receipt of a complaint if it 
concerns events of common knowledge and, ifit deems it useful, it may restate its 
policy on the subject. 
3. Requests for inquiries 
The ICRC can only take part in an inquiry procedure if so required under the 
terms of a treaty or of an ad hoc agreement by all the parties concerned. It never sets 
itself up, however, as a commission of inquiry and limits itself to selecting, from 
outside the institution, persons qualified to take part in such a commission. 
The ICRC shall moreover not take part in an inquiry procedure if the procedure does not 
offer a full guarantee ofirnpartiality and does not provide the parties with means to defend 
their case. The ICRC must also receive an assurance that no public communications on an 
inquiry request or on the inquiry itself shall be made without its consent. 
As a rule, the ICRC shall only take part in the setting up of a commission of 
inquiry, under the above-stated conditions, if the inquiry is concerned with 
infringements of the Geneva Conventions or of their 1977 Protocols. It shall on no 
account participate in the organization of a commission if to do so would hinder or 
prevent it from carrying out its traditional activities for the victims of armed conflicts, 
or if there is a risk of jeopardizing its reputation of impartiality and neutrality .... 
4. Requests to record violations 
If the ICRC is asked to record the result of a violation of international 
humanitarian law, it shall only do so ifit considers that the presence ofits delegates 
will facilitate the discharge of its humanitarian tasks, especially if it is necessary to 
assess victims' requirements in order to be able to help them. Moreover, the ICRC 
shall only send a delegation to the scene of the violation ifit has received an assurance 
that its presence will not be used to political ends. 
These guidelines do not deal with violations of intemational law or humanitarian 
ptinciples to the detriment of detainees whom they have to visit as part of the activities 
which the ICRC's mandate requires it to carry out in the event of internal disturbances 
or tensions within a given State. Since this type of activity is based on ad hoc agreements 
with governments, the ICRC follows specific guidelines in such situations. 
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justified as a response to the unlawful acts of an enemy.35 The sole purpose of a 
reprisal is to induce the enemy to cease its illegal activity and to comply with the 
law of armed conflict. Reprisals may be taken against enemy armed forces, 
enemy civilians other than those in occupied territory, and enemy property.36 
6.2.3.1 Requirements for Reprisal. To be valid, a reprisal action must 
conform to the following criteria: 
34.( ... continued) 
1981 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 81-83. See also ICRC Protection and Assistance Activities in Situations 
Not Covered by International Humanitarian Law, 1988 id. 9-37. 
35. Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals 33 (1971). McDougal and Feliciano have defined reprisal 
during armed conflict as follows: 
Legitimate war reprisals refer to acts directed against the enemy which are conceded 
to be generally unlawful, but which constitute an authorized reaction to prior 
unlawful acts ofther.enemy for the purpose of deterring repetition of such antecedent 
acts. The doctrine of reprisal thus permits the use of otherwise lawless violence as a 
response to the lawless violence. 
McDougal & Feliciano 679-80. 
36. Reprisals may lawfully be taken against enemy individuals who have not yet fallen into the 
hands of the forces making the repnsals. Under customary international law, members of the 
enemy civilian population are legitimate objects of reprisals. The United States nonetheless considers 
reprisal actions against civilians not otherwise legitimate objects of attack to be inappropriate in most 
circumstances. For nations party to GP I, enemy civilians and the enemy civilian population are 
prohibited objects of reprisal. The United States has found this new prohibition to be militarily 
unacceptable because renunciation of the option of such attacks "removes a significant deterrent that 
presendy protects civilians and other war victims on all sides of a conflict." Sofaer, Remarks, paragraph 
6.2, note 18 (p. 329) at 469. For a contrary view, see Kalshoven, Noncombatant Persons, in Robertson 
at 306. See paragraph 6.2.3.2 (p. 340) for a further discussion ofinununity from reprisals. 
Collective loss of rights for residents of occupied territory is clearly prohibited by art. 33 of GC. 
Internment and assigned residence, whether in the occupying power's natural territory or in 
occupied territory, are" exceptional" measures to be taken only after careful consideration of each 
individual case. These strict limitations are a direct reaction to the abuses which occurred during 
World Wars I and II. See 4 Pictet 256-58. See also Terry, State Terrorism: AJuridical Examination 
in Terms of Existing International Law, 10 J. Pal. Studies 94 (1980) for a thorough discussion of 
illegal collective measures in occupied territory. 
Paragraph 6.2.3 deals only with reprisals taken by one belligerent in response to illegal acts of 
warfare performed by the armed forces of an enemy. Paragraph 6.2.3 does not deal with the 
collective measures an occupying power may take against the population of an occupied territory 
in response to illegitimate acts of hostility conunitted by the civilian population. Art. 50 ofHR 
provided that no general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, may be inflicted upon the population of 
occupied territory on account of acts of individuals "for which they cannot be regarded as joindy 
and severally responsible," and contemplated that bona fide fines, in a reasonable amount, intended 
to insure respect for the rules and decrees in force, were lawful (Levie, 2 The Code of 
International Armed Conflict 743). GC, art. 33(1) provides that penal liability is personal: 
No protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally 
conunitted. Collective penalties ... are prohibited. 
(continued ... ) 
Adherence and Enforcement 339 
1. Reprisal must be ordered by an authorized representative of the belligerent 
government.37 (For the rule applicable to the United States, see paragraph 6.2.3.3). 
2. It must respond to illegal acts of warfare conunitted by an adversary 
government, its military commanders, or combatants for which the adversary is 
'bl An" . al . th . d 38 respoosl e. ttclpatory repns IS not au onze. 
3. When circumstances permit, re~risal must be preceded by a demand for redress 
by the enemy of its unlawful acts. 9 
4. Its purpose must be to cause the enemy to cease its unlawful activity. Therefore, 
acts taken in reprisal should be brought to the attention of the enemy in order to 
hi . ffc' 40 R . al b tak r. 41 ac eve maxunum e eCtlveness. epns must never e en lor revenge. 
5. Reprisal must only be used as a last resort when other enforcement measures 
have failed or would be of no avail.42 
6. Each reprisal must be proportional to the original violation.43 
36.( ... continued) 
Although the collective measures taken by an occupying power against the population of an 
occupied territory are frequendy referred to as "reprisals," they should be clearly distinguished 
from reprisals between belligerents dealt with here. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that 
GC arts. 4 & 33(3) prohibit reprisals against civilians in occupied territory. Thus, those acts 
permitted cannot amount to penal punishments or reprisals. See also Lowe, The Commander's 
Handbook on the Law ofNaval Operations and the Contemporary Law of the Sea, in Robertson 
at 133-34. 
37. See AFP 110-31, para. 10-7c(8). See also paragraph 6.2.3.3 (p. 341). 
38. A careful inquiry by the injured belligerent into the alleged violating conduct should 
precede the authorization of any reprisal measure. This is subject to the important qualification 
that, in certain circumstances, an offended belligerent is justified in taking immediate reprisals 
against illegal acts of warfare, particularly in those situations where the safety ofhis armed forces 
would clearly be endangered by a continuance of the enemy's illegal acts. See paragraph 6.2.3.3 
(p. 341) regarding authority to order reprisals. 
39. There must be reasonable notice that reprisals will be taken. Green, The Contemporary 
Law of Armed Conflict (1993) at 119. The degree of notice required will depend upon the 
particular circumstances of each case. Notice is nonnally given after the enemy's violation but may, 
in appropriate circumstances, predate an imminent violation. An example of notice is an appeal to 
the transgressor to cease its offending conduct and punish those responsible. Such an appeal may 
serve both as a plea for compliance and a notice to the adversary that reprisals will be taken 
otherwise. See also FM 27-10, para. 497b. 
40. Acts taken in reprisal may also be brought to the attention of neutrals if necessary to achieve 
maximum effectiveness. Since reprisals are undertaken to induce an adversary's compliance with 
the recognized rules of anned conflict, any action taken as a reprisal must be armounced as a reprisal 
and publicized so that the adversary is aware ofits obligation to abide by the law and to ensure that 
the reprisal action is not, itself, viewed as an unlawful act. See McDougal & Feliciano 689 and AFP 
110-31, para. 10-7c. 
41. FM 27-10, para. 497d. 
42. ld., para. 497b. 
43. This rule is not one of strict equivalence because the reprisal will usually be somewhat 
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7. A reprisal action must cease as soon as the enemy is induced to desist from its 
unlawful activities and to comply with the law of armed conflict.44 
6.2.3.2 Immunity From Reprisal. Reprisals are forbidden to be taken against: 
1 P · f 45 d . d . ili· 46 . nsoners 0 war an Interne CIV ans 
2. Wounded, sick, and shipwrecked persons 47 
3. Civilians in occupied territory 48 
4. Hospitals and medical facilities, personnel,49 and equipment, including hospital 
ships, medical aircraft, and medical vehicles.50 
43.( ... continued) 
greater than the initial violation that gave rise to it. However, care must be taken that the extent of 
the reprisal is measured by some degree of proportionality and not solely by effectiveness. Effective 
but disproportionate reprisals cannot be justified by the argument that only an excessive response 
will forestall a further transgression. Compare McDougal & Feliciano 682-83. 
The acts resorted to by way of reprisal need not conform in kind to those complained of by the 
injured belligerent. The reprisal action taken may be quite different from the original act which 
justified it, but should not be excessive or exceed the degree of harm required to deter the enemy 
from continuance of his initial unlawful conduct. McDougal & Feliciano 682. 
If an act is a lawful reprisal, it cannot lawfully be a basis for a counter-reprisal. Under international 
law, there can be no reprisal against a lawful reprisal. 
44. When, for example, one party to an armed conflict commits a breach oflaw but follows 
that violation with an expression of regret and promise that it will not be repeated, then any action 
taken by another party to "right" the situation cannot be justified as a law/hl reprisal. 
45. GPW, art. 13(3); GPW 1929, art. 2(3). Prisoners of war are defined in GPW, art. 4A; see 
paragraph 11.7 (p. 489). In light of the wide acceptance of the 1949 Geneva Conventions by the 
nations of the world today, this prohibition is part of customary law. Meron, The Geneva 
Conventions as Customaty Law, 81 Am.]. Int'l L. 348 (1987); Meron, Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989). Compare NWIP 10-2, para. 31Oe(1) n.8 ("War 
crimes tribunals have considered the rule forbiclding reprisals against prisoners of war as a 
codification of existing customaty law. Hence, this prohibition may be regarded as binding upon 
all States regardless of whether or not they are parties to the 1949 Convention.") with Levie, 
Prisoners of War 366-69 (describing contrary State practice duting both World Wars and the 
Korean and Vietnam conflicts). The taking of prisoners by way of reprisal for acts previously 
committed (so-called "reprisal prisoners") is likewise forbidden. 
46. GC, art. 33(3); see also paragraph 11.8 (p. 495). 
47. GWS, art. 46, GWS-Sea, art. 47, as defined in GPW, art. 4A. 
48. GC, art. 33, as defined in GC, art. 4. Also immune from reprisals under the Geneva 
Conventions are the property of such inhabitants, enemy civilians in a belligerent's own territory, 
and the property of such civilians. GC, art. 33, as defined in GC, art. 4. 
Civilians not protected from reprisal under these provisions are nationals of a nation not bound by 
the GC, nationals of a neutral nation in the territory of a belligerent, and nationals of a 
cobelligerent so long as their nation has normal diplomatic relations with the nation in whose 
territory they are. These exceptions are eliminated under GP I for nations bound thereby. 
49. GWS, art. 46, GWS Sea, art. 47. Medical personnel are defined in GWS, arts. 24-26 and 
GWS-Sea, art. 36. See paragraph 11.5 (p. 486). Chaplains attached to the armed forces (GWS, art. 
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6.2.3.3 Authority to Order Reprisals. The President alone may authorize 
the taking of a reprisal action by U.S. forces. 51 Although reprisal is lawful when 
the foregoing requirements are met, there is always the risk that it will trigger 
retaliatory escalation (counter-reprisals) by the enemy.52 The United States has 
historically been reluctant to resort to reprisal for just this reason. 
49.( ... continued) 
46, GWS-Sea, art. 47) as set forth in GWS, art. 24 and GWS-Sea, art. 36, are also immune from 
reprisal. See also Green, Essays on the Modem Law of War (1985) at chap VI. 
50. Fixed establishments and mobile medical units of the medical service, hospital ships, coastal 
rescue craft and their installations, medical transports, and medical aircraft are immune from reprisal 
under GWS, art. 46, GWS-Sea, art. 47, as set forth in GWS, arts. 19,20,35 & 36; GWS-Sea, arts. 
22, 24, 25, 27 & 39. 
McDougaland Feliciano, in cornmenting on the question ofumnunityfiomreprisal, axgue that 
The cumulative effect of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is that all enemy persons 
who find themselves within a belligerent's effective control are immunized as targets 
of reprisal. Practically the only enemy persons who may be lawfully subjected to 
reprisals are those on the high seas and in the enemy's own teritory. 
McDougal & Feliciano 684. 
51. See also paragraph 6.2.3.1 (p. 338). 
52. McDougal & Feliciano 689. Other £actors which governments will usually consider before 
taking reprisals include the following: 
1. Reprisals may have an adverse influence on the attitudes of governments not 
participating in an armed conflict. 
2. Reprisals may only strengthen enemy morale and underground resistance. 
3. Reprisals may only lead to counter-reprisals by an enemy, in which case the 
enemy's ability to retaliate effectively is an important factor. 
4. Reprisals may render enemy resources less able to contribute to the 
rehabilitation of an area after the cessation of hostilities. 
5. The threat of reprisals may be more effective than their actual use. 
6. Reprisals, to be effective, should be carried out speedily and should be kept 
under control. They may be ineffective if random, excessive, or prolonged. 
7. In any event, the decision to employ reprisals will generally be reached as a 
matter of strategic policy. The immediate advantage sought must be weighed 
against the possible long-range military and political consequences. 
AFP 110-31, para. 10-7d, citing NWIP 10-2, ch. 3, n. 6. 
Many attempted uses of reprisals in past conflicts have been unjustified either because the reprisals 
were not undertaken to deter violations by an adversary or were disproportionate to the preceding 
unlawful conduct. In addition to the legal requirements which regulate resort to reprisals, there are 
various practical £actors which governments will consider before taking reprisals. For example, 
when appeal to the enemy for redress has failed, it may be a matter of policy to consider before 
resorting to reprisals, whether the opposing forces are not more likely to be influenced by a steady 
adherence to the law of armed conflict. The relative importance of these political and practical 
factors depends upon the degree and kind of armed conflict, the character of the adversary and its 
resources, and the importance of nations not participating in hostilities. See Colbert, Retaliation in 
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6.2.4 Reciprocity. Some obligations under the law of armed conflict are 
reciprocal in that they are binding on the parties only so long as both sides 
continue to comply with them. 53 A major violation by one side will release the 
other side from all further duty to abide by that obligation. The concept of 
52.( ... continued) 
International Law (1948); 10 Whiteman 317-39; Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals (1971); and 
Greenwood, Reprisals and Reciprocity in the New Law of Armed Conflict, in Armed Conflict 
and the New Law (Meyer ed. 1989) at 227 for thorough discussions of reprisals. 
The following activities, otherwise prohibited under the law of armed conflict, are among those 
which may lawfully be taken in reprisal: 
1. Restricted means and methods of warfare set forth in the Hague Conventions of1907 
and, for parties thereto, in GP I, unless specifically prohibited as a means of reprisal. Among the 
otherwise unlawful means and methods of warfare that may be employed as reprisal are: 
a. employing poison or poisoned weapons; 
b. killing, wounding or capturing treacherously or perfidiously individuals 
belonging to the hostile nation or army, such as by feigning incapacitation 
by wounds or sickness or of civilian noncombatant status; 
c. killing or wounding an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or 
having no longer a means of defense, has surrendered at discretion; 
d. declaring that no quarter will be given; 
e. employing weapons, projectiles, or material or methods of warfare of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering; 
£ making improper use of a flag ofrruce, of the national, or neutral flag or of 
the military insignia and uniform of the enemy as well as the distinctive 
badges of the Geneva Conventions; 
g. use of unanchored submarine contact mines or mines and torpedoes 
which do not render themselves harmless within one hour after they have 
broken loose from their moorings or have been fired. 
2. Military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques prohibited by 
the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention. 
3. For nations party thereto, the use of weapons the primary effect of which is to injure by 
fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays, in violation of Protocol I to the 
1980 Conventional Weapons Convention. 
4. For nations party thereto, the use of mines, booby traps and other devices, in violation of 
Protocol II to the Conventional Weapons Convention. 
5. For nations party thereto (not including the United States), the use of incendiary 
weapons in a manner which violates Protocol III to the Conventional Weapons Convention. 
For a discussion ofU .S. objections to new restrictions on reprisal set forth in GP I, see paragraph 
6.2.3, note 36 (p. 338). Compare Hampson, Belligerent Reprisals and the 1977 Protocols to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, 37 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 818 (1988). See also Aldrich, Compliance 
with International Huarnnitarian Law, 1991 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 294, 301-03, who examines the 
need for States contemplating ratification ofGP I, with and without accepting the competence of 
the Fact Finding Commission, to reserve one or more of the provisions on reprisals. 
53. Most rruces and armistices are of this nature. 
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reciprocity is not applicable to humanitarian rules oflaw that protect the victims 
of anned conflict, that is, those persons protected by the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. 54 The decision to consider the United States released from a 
particular obligation following a major violation by the enemy will be made by the 
NCA. 
6.2.5 War Crimes Under International Law. For the purposes of this 
publication, war crimes are defined as those acts which violate the law of anned 
conflict, that is, the rules established by customary and conventional 
international law regulating the conduct of warfare, and which have been 
generally recognized as war crimes. Acts constituting war crimes may be 
committed by the anned forces of a belligerent or by individuals belonging to the 
civilian population. 55 Belligerents have the obligation under international law to 
54. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60(5) reprinted in 8 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 679 
(1969); de Preux, The Geneva Conventions and Reciprocity, 1985 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 25 (those 
portions ofGP I & II supplementing the 1949 Geneva Conventions are also not subject to the 
principle of reciprocity). 
55. War crimes, as defined in paragraph 6.2.5, are distinguished from "crimes against peace" 
and "crimes against humanity." This distinction may be seen from art. 6 of the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, which defined the Tribunal's jurisdiction as 
follows: 
The following acts, or any one of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility [see paragraph 6.1.4 
(p.328)]: 
(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war 
of aggression, or a war in violation ofinternational treaties, agreements or assurances, 
or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of 
the foregoing; 
(b) Waraimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall 
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill treatment, or deportation to slave labor or 
for any other purpose, of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill 
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of 
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity; 
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in 
execution of orin connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetuated. 
U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents 1944-45, at 254 (1946); AFP 110-20, at 
3-183. 
Although the distinction between crimes against peace and war crimes is readily apparent, there is a 
certain difficulty in distinguishing war crimes from crimes against humanity. The precise scope of 
those acts included within the category of crimes against humanity is not entirely clear from the 
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55.( ... continued) 
definition given in art. 6 of the Charter of The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. A 
survey of the judgments of the various tribunals which tried individuals for crimes against 
humanity committed during W orId War II may be summarized in the following manner: 
1. Certain acts constitute both war crimes and crimes against humanity and may be 
tried under either charge. 
2. Generally, crimes against humanity are offenses against the human rights of 
individuals, carried on in a widespread and systematic manner. Thus, isolated 
offenses have not been considered as crimes against humanity, and courts have 
usually insisted upon proof that the acts alleged to be crimes against humanity 
resulted from systematic governmental action. 
3. The possible victims of crimes against humanity constitute a wider class than 
those who are capable of being made the objects of war crimes and may include the 
nationals of the State committing the offense as well as stateless persons. 
4. Acts constituting crimes against humanity must be committed in execution of, or 
in connection with, crimes against peace, or war crimes. 
See Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L (1946) 178; Dinstein, Crimes Against 
Humanity, in Theory ofInternational Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century (Makarczyk ed. 
1996); Levie, Violation of Human Rights as War Crimes, 1995 Isr. Y.B. Human Rights 119. 
On 21 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 177(11) 
affirming "the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal" and directing the International Law Commission of 
the United Nations to: 
(a) Formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the 
Nuremburg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal, and 
(b) Prepare a draft code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind .... 
The text of the principles formulated by the United Nations International Law Commission, with 
a commentary, is reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission Covering its Second 
Session, General Assembly Official Records: Fifth Session, Supp. No. 12 (A/1316), Pt. III, pp. 
11-14 (1950); Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1950, at 374-80; and Schindler & 
Toman 923-24. That text reads as follows: 
Principle I. Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under 
international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment. 
Principle II. The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which 
constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who 
committed the act from responsibility under international law. 
Principle III. The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime 
under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official 
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law. 
Principle IV. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order ofhis Government or of a 
superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a 
moral choice was in fact possible to him. 
Principle V. Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right 
to a fair trial on the facts and law. 
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55.( ... continued) 
Principle VI. The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under 
international law: [Here follow substantially similar definitions of crimes against peace, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, as are given in art. 6 of the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, quoted at the beginning of this note.] 
Principle VII. Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or 
a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international 
law. 
For a discussion of difficulties in punishing war crimes committed in non-international armed 
conflicts, see Plattner, The Penal Repression of Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1990 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 409. See also Meron, 
International Criminalization ofIntemalAtrocities, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 554 (1995); Bothe, War Crimes 
in Non-International Conflicts in War Crimes in International Law (Dinstein & Tabory eds. 1996) at 
293-306. For a comprehensive and chilling analysis of crimes against humanity committed by 
governments against their own populations, see Rummel, Death by Government (1994). 
The International Tribunal for Yugoslavia, established in 1993 pursuant to U.N.S.C. Resolution 
829 (see paragraph 6.1.3, note 13 (p. 327», was empowered to prosecute persons for: 
a. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; 
b. Violations of the laws or customs of war; 
c. Genocide; and 
d. Crimes against humanity. 
In contrast, and reflecting the differing factual and legal setting between the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia and that in Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established in 
1994 pursuant to U.N .S.C. Resolution 955 (see paragraph 6.1.3, note 13 (p. 327», was empowered 
to prosecute persons for: 
a. Genocide 
b. Crimes against humanity 
c. Violations of common article 3 and of GP II 
Crimes against humanity are identically defined in art. 5 of the Statute for the International Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia and in art. 3 of the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as: 
... the following crimes committed in armed conflict, whether international or 
internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: 
(a) murder; 
(b) extermination; 
(c) enslavement; 
(d) deportation; 
(e) imprisonment; 
(f) torture; 
(g) rape; 
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) other inhumane acts. 
The inclusion of rape on this listing of crimes against humanity represents a departure from 
Nuremberg where rape was neither mentioned in the Nuremberg Charter nor prosecuted as a war 
crime. However, GC, art. 27, provides that: 
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape ... . 
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punish their own nationals, whether members of the armed forces or civilians, 
who commit war crimes. 56 International law also provides that belligerents have 
the right to punish enemy armed forces personnel and enemy civilians who fall 
under their control for such offenses. 57 
55.( ... continued) 
The United States considers that GC, art. 27, and comparable provisions ofGPW (arts. 13 & 14), 
establish rape as a war crime. See Meron, Comment: Rape as a Crime Under International 
Humanitarian Law, 87 Am.]. Int'l L. 425 (1993). 
Genocide is defined in both Statutes (Yugoslavia, art. 4; Rwanda, art. 2) as: 
... any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group; 
This definition is identical to that set forth in art. II of the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Paris, 12January 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, reprinted in 11 
Whiteman 849 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The Genocide Convention entered into 
force for the U.S. on 23 February 1989. The Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 
Pub. L. 100-606 of Nov. 41988, with commentary, is reprinted in28 Int'ILeg. Mat'Is 754 (1989). It 
is important to note that genocide "whether committed in time of peace or in time of war is a crime 
under international law." (Genocide Convention, art. I). 
56. The most recent action of the United States with respect to this obligation occurred on 21 
August 1996 when President Clinton signed into law the War Crimes Act of1996. Pub. L. 104-192, 
110 Stat. 2184, 18 U.S.c. 2401 reprinted in 35 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1539 (1996). The Act provides: 
2401. War Crimes 
(a) OFFENSE.-Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a grave 
breach of the Geneva Conventions, in any of the circumstances described in subsection (b), shall be 
fined under this tide or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death results to the 
victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death. 
(b) CIRCUMSTANCES.-The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that the 
person committing such breach or the victim of such breach is a member of the Armed Forces of 
the United States ora national of the United States (as deined in section 101 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act). 
(c) DEFINITIONS.-As used in this section, the term 'grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions' means conduct defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions 
relating to the laws of warfare signed at Geneva 12 August 1949 or any protocol to any such 
convention, to which the United States is a party. 
For a comprehensive discussion of military jurisdiction over war crimes committed by foreign 
nations see Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction Over Foreign Nationals Who 
Commit International Crimes, 153 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (Summer 1996). 
57. With respect to "grave breaches" (see following note), parties to the Geneva Conventions 
of1949 are obliged to search out, bring to trial and to punish all persons, regardless of nationality, 
who have committed or ordered to be committed, a grave breach of the Conventions. GWS, art. 
49(2); GWS-Sea, art. 50(2); GPW, art. 129(2); GC, art. 146(2). See Flores, Repression ofBreaches 
of the Law of War Committed by Individuals, 1991 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 247. 
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Th fc 11 . .. 58 e 0 oWing acts are representattve war cnmes: 
1. Offenses against prisoners of war, including killing without just cause; torture or 
inhumane treatment; subjection to public insult or curiosity; unhealthy, 
57.( ... continued} 
The cases of misconduct by u.s. combatants in Vietnam are analyzed through examination of 
court-martial convictions in Parks, Crimes in Hostilities, Marine Corps Gazette, Aug. 1976, at 
16-22 & Sep. 1976, at 33-39. 
58. While any violation of the law of armed conflict is a war crime, certain crimes are defined 
as "grave breaches" by GWS, art. 50; GWS-Sea, art. 51; GPW, art. 130; GC, art. 147 ifcomrnitted 
against persons or property protected by the Conventions. They include: 
1. Willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment of protected persons; 
2. Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health of protected 
persons; 
3. Taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property not 
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; 
4. Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of:( protected 
person; 
5. Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a 
hostile power; and, 
6. Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of 
tair and regular trial prescribed in the Geneva Conventions. 
GP I, arts. 11(4) & 85(2-4}, codify in greater detail the two separate categories of grave breaches. 
The first category relates to combat activities and medical experimentation and provides for the 
first time a meaningful standard by which such acts can be judged. A breach within this category 
requires (1) willfulness and (2) that death or serious injury to body or health be caused (art. 85(3». 
GP I provides that the following acts constitute grave breaches: 
1. Making the civilivan population or individual civilians the object of attack; 
2. Launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian 
objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause extensive loss oflife, injury to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects, as defined in article 57, paragraph 2(a)(iii}; 
3. Launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces 
in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss oflife, injury to civilians 
or damage to civilian objects, as defined in article 57, paragraph 2(a)(iii}; 
4. Making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of attack; 
5. Making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he is hOTS de combat; 
6. The perfidious use, in violation of ~rtiC1e 37, of the distinctive emblem of the red 
cross, red crescent, or other protective sign recognized by the Conventions or this 
Protocol; 
7. Physical multilations; 
8. Medical or scientific experiments; and, 
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dangerous, or otherwise prohibited labor; infringement of religious rights; and 
denial of fair trial for offenses59 
58.( ... continued) 
9. Removal of tissue or organs for transplantation, except where these acts are 
justified in conformity with the state of health of the person or consistent with 
medical practice or conditions provided for in the Conventions. 
(a) Exceptions may be made only in the case of donations of blood for 
transfusion or of skin for grafting, provided that they are given voluntarily 
and without any coercion or inducement, and then only for therapeutic 
purposes, under conditions consistent with generally accepted medical 
standards and controls designed for the benefit of both the donor and the 
recipient. 
(b) Any willful act or omission which seriously endangers the physical or 
mental health or integrity of any person who is in the power of a Party other 
than the one on which he depends and which either violates any of the 
prohibitions above or fails to comply with these requirements is a grave 
breach of Protocol I. 
The second category of grave breaches defined by GP I is in art. 85(4). The only requirement to be 
satisfied with respect to these offenses is willfulness. 
1. The transfer by the occupying power of parts ofits own civilian population into 
the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the 
population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory, in violation of 
article 49 of the [GC]; 
2. Unjustified delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians; 
3. Practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving 
outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination; 
4. Making the clearly recognized historic monuments, works of art or places of 
worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples and to which 
special protection has been given by special arrangement, for example, within the 
framework of a competent international organization, the object of attack, causing 
as a result extensive destruction thereof, where there is no evidence of the violation 
by the adverse Party of article 53, subparagraph (b), and when such historic 
monuments, works of art and places or worship are not located in the immediate 
proximity of military objectives, and, 
5. Depriving a person protected by the Conventions or referred to in paragraph 2 
of Article 85 of fair and regular trial. 
See also Levie, 2 The Code ofIntemational Armed Conflict 857-71; Burgos, The Taking of 
Hostages and International Humanitarian Law, 1989 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 196; and International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, New York, December 17,1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 
205, T.I.A.S. 11081. 
59. Principle VI (b) , 1950 Nuremberg Principles (see note 55 (p. 343»; GPW, arts. 13, 17(4), 
34-37,52,84, 87(3), 105 & 130; GP I, art. 75(2)(a). 
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2. Offenses against civilian inhabitants of occupied territory, including killing 
without just cause, torture or inhumane treatment, forced labor{, deportation, 
infringement of religious rights, and denial of fair trial for offenses 0 
3. Offenses against the sick and wounded, including killing, wounding, or 
mistreating enemy forces disabled by sickness or wounds61 
4. Denial of quarter (i.e., killing or wounding an enemy hOTS de combat or making a 
genuine offer of surrender) and offenses against combatants who have laid down 
their arms and surrendered62 
5. Offenses against the survivors of ships and aircraft lost at sea, including killing, 
wounding, or mistreating the shipwreckedi and failing to provide for the safety of 
survivors as military circumstances permit 3 
60. Principle VI(b), 1950 Nuremberg Principles; GC, arts. 27(1), 31-32, 49(6), 95(3), 100, 
118(1) & 147; GP I, art. 75 (2) (a); GP II, art. 4(2)(a). 
61. Lieber Code, art. 71; HR, art. 23(c); GWS, arts. 12(2) & 50; GP I, arts. 10,41 & 85(3); GP 
II, arts. 4(1) & 7(1). 
62. HR, arts. 23(c) & 23(d); GP I, art. 40; GP II, art. 4(1); Trial of Von Ruchtesdlell, 9 :tR.:r'WC 
82 (British military court, Hamburg, 1947) (denial of quarter at sea). See paragraph 11.9.5 (p. 499) 
regarding use of the white flag. 
63. Principle VI(b), 1950 Nuremberg Principles; GWS-Sea, arts. 12(2) & 51. This rule was 
applied in the 1921 case of the llandovery Castle, 16 Am.]. Int'l L. 708 (1922); and in a number of 
World War II cases, including TIle PELEUS Trial, 1 LRTWC 1 (British Military Court, Hamburg, 
1945), TIle Trial of Moehle, 9 LRTWC 75 (British Military Court, Hamburg, 1946) and in the Trial of 
Helmuth Von Rudltesdlell, 9 LRTWC 92 (1949). The PELEUS and Von Ruchteschell cases are 
summarized in Mallison 133-43 and in Jacobsen, A Juridical Examination of the Israeli Attack on the 
U.S.S. Liberty, 36 Nav. L. Rev. 48 & 50 (1986).Jacobsen 45-51 argues the Israelimachinegunningof 
liferafts on board and thrown from USS LIBERTY, after the attack on the LIBERTY was 
completed, f.ills within this prohibition. See paragraph 11.4 (p. 484). There was no prosecution of 
U.S. and Australian forces for the systematic killing of the Japanese survivoxs of the March 1943, 
Battle of the Bismark Sea, who were in lifeboats or clinging to wreckage. See 6 Morison, History of 
the United States Naval Operations in World War II, 62 etseq. (1950); Spector, Eagle Against the Sun 
227-28 (1985); Dower, War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War 67 (1986). Indeed 
the Commanding Officer of USS WAHOO was awarded the Navy Cross and an Army 
Distinguished Service Cross following his January 1943 patrol notwithstanding his slaughter of the 
survivoxs ofW AHOO's torpedoing ofa convoy of two freightexs and a large transport. 2 Blair, Silent 
Victory 357-60 (1975); Dower 66-67 & n.94. Blair notes that, although the Commanding Officer 
[D]escribed the killing of the hundreds (or thousands) ofsurvivoxs of the transport ... 
no queston was raised about it in the glowing patrol report endoxsements, where 
policy was usually set forth. Many submarinexs interpreted this-and the honoxs and 
publicity showered on [Captain] Morton and Wahoo---as tacit approval from the 
submarine high command. In fact, neither Lockwood [Commander Submarine 
Force Pacific] nor Christie [Commander Task Force 51] nor Fife [Commander Task 
Force 42] ever issued a policy statement on the subject. Whether other skippexs 
should follow Morton's example was left up to the individual. Few did. 
Blair 359-60. The following language ofGWS-Sea, art. 12, makes clear that since the coming into 
force of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, such acts are unlawful: 
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6. Wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages or devastation not justified by 
the requirements of military operations; and bombardment, the sole purpose of 
which is to attack and terrorize the civilian population 64 
7. Deliberate attack upon medical facilities, hospital ships, medical aircraft, medical 
vehicles, or medical personnel65 
8. Plunder and pillage of public or private property66 
9. Mutilation or other mistreatment of the dead67 
10. Employing forbidden arms or ammunition 68 
11. Misuse, abuse, or firing on flags of truce or on the Red Cross device, and 
imil· . bl . d' al 69 s ar protectIve em ems, SIgnS, an SIgn s 
12. Treacherous re~uest for quarter (i.e., feigning surrender in order to gain a 
military advantage). 0 
6.2.5.1 Trials During Hostilities. Although penrutted under international 
law, nations rarely try enemy combatants while hostilities are in progress.71 Such 
63.( ... continued) 
Article 12 
Members of the anned forces ... who are at sea and who are .... shipwrecked, shall 
be respected and protected in all circumstances, it being understood that the tenn 
"shipwreck" means shipwreck from any cause .... 
See Doswald-Beck at 136. 
64. HR, arts. 23(g) & 25; Hague IX, art. 1(1); Principle VI(b), 1950 Nuremberg Principles; 
GP I, art. 51(2); GP II, art. 13(2). 
65. GWS, arts. 19(1),20 & 36(1); GWS-Sea, arts. 22-27 & 39(1); GC, arts. 18(1),21,22(1); 
GP I, arts. 12 & 22; GP II, art. 11; Uandovery Castle Case oj Ditlzmar and Boldt, Gennan 
Reichgericht, 16 July 1921, 16 Am. J. Int'l L. 708 (1922). 
66. HR, arts. 28, 47 & 56; Hague IX, art. 7; Principle VI(b), 1950 Nuremberg Principles; 
GWS, art. 15(1); GWS-Sea, art. 18(1); GC, arts. 16(2) & 33(2); GP II, arts. 4(2)(g) & 8. 
67. GWS, art. 15(1); GWS-SEA, art. 18(1); GC, art. 16(2); GP I, art. 34(1); GP II, art. 8. 
68. HR, arts. 23(a) & 23(e); GP I, art. 35(2). 
69. HR, arts. 23(f) & 32-34; 1923 Radio Rules, art. 10 (reprinted in 32Am.J. Int'lL. Supp!. 10, 
(1938»; Levie, 2 The Code ofIntemationalAnned Conflict 871 (distress signals); GP I, arts. 37(1), 
38(1) & 85(3)(f); GWS, arts. 53 & 54; GWS-Sea, arts. 43 & 45; GP I, arts. 18(8),38 & 85(3)(f); Trial 
oJHeinz Hagendoif, 11 LR TWC 146 (U.S. military court at Dachau, 1946). See 10 Whiteman 398 
(white flag lawfully fired on during Korean War); Higginbotham, Case Studies in the Law ofLand 
Warfare II: The Campaign in the Falklands, Military Rev., Oct. 1984, at 53. 
70. HR, art. 23(b); GP I, art. 40. 
71. Exceptions include limited Russian trials in 1943 (McDougal & Feliciano 704) and the trial 
ofDoolitde's raiders inJapan (Glines, Doolitde's Raiders (1964); Schultz, The Doolitde Raid 
305-17,347-48 (1988); and Spaight 58). This is not to deny that atrocities were committed against 
prisoners of war, but only to suggest that this method of adjudication is not routinely employed 
against lawful combatants. 
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trials might provoke undesirable actions from an enemy and complicate 
humanitarian protections aPt§licable to one's own nationals? Trials of unlawful 
combatants have been held. Yet, for similar reasons, such trials may be less than 
rigorously pursued during the course of hostilities. (Regarding trials of a nation's 
own forces, see paragraph 6.2.5.3.) 
6.2.5.2 Trials After Hostilities. Even after the close of hostilities, criminal 
trials against lawful enemy combatants have been the exception, not the rule?4 
72. GPW art. 85 does not prohibit such trials, but does require that prisoners of war retain, 
even if convicted, the benefits of that Convention. Many fonner Conununist nations reserved art. 
85, in various fonns, e.g.: 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not consider itself bound by the 
obligation, which follows from Article 85, to extend the application of the 
Convention to prisoners of war who have been convicted under the law of the 
Detaining Power, in accordance with the principles of the Nuremberg trial, for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, it being understood that persons convicted of 
such crimes must be subject to the conditions obtaining in the country in question 
for those who undergo their punishment. 
The United States explicidy rejected these reservations while accepting treaty relations with the 
reserving countries as to the remaining unreserved provisions. The reservations are quoted in 
Schindler & Toman 563-94. The reservations to art. 85 are analyzed in Pilloud, Reservations to the 
Geneva Conventions of1949, 1976 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 170-80. 
For the United States reaction to the threat by the North Viemamese Government to try U.S. 
prisoners of war, see the 13 July 1966 memorandum of the Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of 
State, reprinted in 10 Whiteman 231 and Moore, Law and The Indo-China War 635 (1972). 
73. See paragraphs 6.2.5.3 (p. 353) and 12.7.1 (p. 515) and 10 Whiteman 150-95. 
Historically, unlawful combatants were often not afforded the benefit of trials although this is now 
required by GWS, art. 49; GWS-Sea, art. 50; GPW, art. 129; GC, art. 146; and, for nations party 
thereto, GP I, art. 75. Ex Parte Quirin, 317U.S. 1 (1942), involved the trial of unlawful combatants 
who were German soldiers smuggled into the United States via submarine who discarded their 
unifonns upon entry, but were captured prior to committing acts of sabotage (see paragraph 12.5.3 
(p.513». 
On historical precedents for war crime trials of adversary personnel, particularly unlawful 
combatants, see Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 Cal. L. Rev. 177, 203 
(1945). He notes: 
War criminals ... are especially found among irregular combatants and fonner 
soldiers who have quit their posts to plunder and pillage ... such as bandits, brigands, 
buccaneers, bushwackers, filibusters, franctireurs, free-booters, guerrillas, ladrones, 
marauders, partisans, pirates and robbers ... Historically, brigandage has been to a 
large extent international in character ... Brigandage is a thriving byproduct of war. 
The object ... is to bring out the connection between the past and the present. .. It is 
not meant to be suggested that war crimes committed by members of regularly 
constituted units are any less amenable to such jurisdiction. 
74. As to unlawful combatants, this was frequendy done by sununary punishment without 
benefit of trial. See Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 Cal. L. Rev. 177 
(1945). 
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After World War I, responsibility for initiating that conflict was formally 
assigned to Kaiser Wilhelm, and an extensive report of alleged atrocities 
committed by German troops was prepared by the Allies. No international trials 
were held against World War I combatants. Some trials were held by German 
authorities of German personnel as required by the Allies.75 Due to the gross 
excesses of the Axis Powers during World War II, involving not only initiation 
of aggressive war but also wholesale execution of ethnic groups and enslavement 
of occupied territories, the Allied Powers determined that large scale assignment 
of individual criminal responsibility was necessary. Crimes against peace and 
crimes against humanity were charges against the principal political, military and 
industrial leaders responsible for the initiation of the war and various inhumane 
policies. The principal offenses against combatants directly related to combat 
activities were the willful killing of prisoners and others in temporary custodr 76 
Since World War II, such prosecutions after conflicts have not occurred.7 
75. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Gennany, Versailles,June 
28, 1919, in 1 The Law ofWar 417 (Friedman ed. 1972); Commission on the Responsibility of the 
Authors of the War and On Enforcement of Penalties, 14 Am. J. Int'!. L. 95 (1920);Judgments of 
the Supreme Court at Leipzig of the [WorldWarI] German War Trials, 16Am.J. Int'IL. 674-724 
(1922); Mullins, The Leipzig Trials (1921); Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law 
27 (1962); Glueck, War Criminals, Their Prosecution and Punishment 19 (1944); U.N. Sec'y 
Gen. Memorandum, Historical Survey of the Questions ofInternational Criminal Jurisdiction, 
AfCN417 fRev.1 (1949). Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, 
21 Br. Y.B. Int'l L. 58, at 84 (1944) notes that of the 901 cases heard before the Leipzig Supreme 
Court in 1923-24, only 13 ended in convictions. 
76. A representative sample of the literature is given: 
Views on the World War II Trials: Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg (1970) (survey of views of 
others); Nuremberg, German Views of the War Trials (Benton and Grimm ed. 1955); Knieriem, 
The Nuremberg Trials (1959) (Gennan); Vogt, The Burden of Guilt (1964) (Gennan); 
Maugham, UNO and War Crimes (1951) (English); Morgan, The Great Assize (1948) (English); 
Klafkowski, The Nuremberg Principles and the Development of International Law (1966) 
(Polish); Ginsberg, Laws of War and War Crimes on the Russian Front: The Soviet View, 11 
Soviet Studies 253 (1960); Green, Superior Orders in National and International Law (1976); 
Taylor, Nuremburg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (1970); Doenitz at Nuremberg: A 
Reappraisal (Thompson & Strutz eds. 1976); Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (1983); Tusa & Tusa, 
The Nuremberg Trial (1984). 
On the Tokyo war crimes trials, see Minear, Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1971); 
Shiroyama, War Criminal: The Life and Death of Hirota Koki (1974, Bester trans!' 1977); and 
Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1987). As 
to Japanese atrocities during WWII generally, see Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes 
in World War II (1996). 
Bibliographies: Garsse, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes Trials: A Bibliography 
(1951); U.S. Library of Congress, The Nazi State, War Crimes and War Criminals (1954). 
Summaries of cases are found in U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals, 15 volumes (1949); Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes (1954); 
U.S. Gov't, Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control 
(continued ... ) 
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6.2.5.3 Jurisdiction over Offenses.78 Except for war crimes trials conducted 
by the Allies after W orId War II, the majority of prosecutions for violations of the 
law of anned conflict have been trials of one's own forces for breaches of military 
discipline. Violations of the law of anned conflict committed by persons subject 
to the military law of the United States will usually constitute violations of the 
Unifonn Code of Military Justice and, if so, will be prosecuted under that 
Code.79 
76.( ... continued) 
Council Law No. 10 (1946-1949) (principal U.S. trials subsequent to International Military 
Tribunal); 11 Whiteman, Digest ofInternational Law 884 (1968). 
Judgments: International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) ,Judgment and Sentence, 41 Am.]. Int'l L. 
172 (1947); International Military Tribunal, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Opinion and 
Judgment (1947), excerpted in U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents 1946-1947, 
at 241-307 (1948); International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment, 3 parts (1948), 
excerpted in U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents 1948-1949, at 76-106 (1950). 
General Literature: Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes 
Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1949); Appleman, Military Tribunals and International 
Crimes (1954); Davidson, The Trial of the Germans: An Account of the Twenty-two Defendants 
Before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (1966);Jackson, The Case Against the Nazi 
War Criminals (1946); Jackson, The Nuremberg Case (1947); Keeshan, Justice at Nuremberg 
(1946); W oetzel, The Nuremberg Trials and International Law (1962); Weingartner, Crossroads of 
Death: The Story of the MaImedy Massacre and Trial (1979); de Zayas, The Wehrrnacht War Crimes 
Bureau, 1939-1945 (1989); Levie, Terrorism in War-The Law ofWar Crimes (1992); War Crimes 
in International Law (Dinstein & Tabory eds. 1996). 
Vietnam: Bilton & Sim, Four Hours in My Lai (1992); Peers, The My Lai Inquiry (1979); The My 
Lai Massacre and its Cover-up (Goldstein, Marshall & Schwartz, eds. 1976) (the 1970 Peers 
Report); Hersh, Cover-Up (1972); McCarthy, Medina (1972); Everett, Johnson & Rosenthal, 
Calley (1971). 
77. As an example, see Agreement on the Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Civilian 
Internees, para. 15, signed by Bangladesh, India and Pakistan 9 April 1974, in 13 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 
505 (1974). Despite the collection by the U.S. and other nations pursuant to U.N .S.C. Resolution 
674 (1990) (see paragraph 6.2, note 20 (p. 330» of extensive evidence of Iraqi war crimes 
committed during the 1990-91 Gulf War, no prosecutions ensued from that effort. See McNeill, 
Panel Discussion, in Grunawalt, King & McClain at 619-20 for a brief account of political 
difficulties that apparendy sidetracked that effort. However, internaitonal support of the concept of 
post-conflict trials is again apparent, as evidenced by the recendy established International Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia (1993) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994). See paragraph 
6.2.5, note 55 (p. 343). 
78. See GWS, art. 49; GWS-Sea, art. 50; GPW, art. 129; GC, art. 146. On U.S. jurisdiction 
over enemy nationals, see UCMJ, art. 18, which creates jurisdiction in general courts-martial to tty 
"any person" who by the law of armed conflict is subject to trial by a military tribunal; R.C.M. 201 
(t)(l)(B), MCM, 1984; FM 27-10, para. 505d; and AFP 110-31, para 15-4a. See also Newton, 
paragraph 6.2.5, note 56 (p. 346). 
79. U.S. military personnel tried by court-martial for offenses that constitute war crimes are either 
charged with the U.S. domestic equivalent of such offenses, e.g., murder (art. 118), rape (art. 120), 
assault (art. 128), cruelty and maltreatment (art. 93); with law-of-war specific offenses, e.g., looting and 
pillaging (art. 103); with conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline (art. 134); or with violation of 
a lawful general order (art. 92), such as art. 0705, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990 (see paragraph 6.1.2 
(p. 324». See also Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial by Fire 32-33 (1989). 
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Although jurisdiction extends to enemy personnel, trials have almost 
exclusively been against unlawful combatants, such as persons who take part in 
combat operations without distinguishing themselves clearly from the civilian 
population during battle or those acting without state sanction for private ends.80 
In the United States, its territories and possessions, jurisdiction is not limited 
to offenses against U.S. nationals, but extends to offenses against persons of other 
nationalities. Violations by enemy nationals may be tried as offenses against 
international law, which forms part of the law of the United States. In occupied 
territories, trials are usually held under occupation law. Trials of such personnel 
have been held in military courts, military commissions, provost courts, military 
government courts, and other military tribunals.81 There is no statute of 
limitations on the prosecution of a war crime.82 (On jurisdiction generally, see 
paragraph 3.11.1.) 
6.2.5.4 Fair Trial Standards. The law of armed conflict establishes minimum 
standards for the trial of foreign nationals charged with war crimes.83 Failure to 
80. See Castrep, The Present Law of War and Neutrality 87 (1954) and Greenspan 502-511. 
The United States normally punishes war crimes, including "grave breaches," as such only if they 
are committed by enemy nationals or by persons serving the interests of enemy nations. Violations of 
the law of anned conflict committed within the United States by other persons will usually constitute 
violations of federal or state criminal law and preferably will be prosecuted under such law. 
81. Although UCM], art. 21, establishes concurrent jurisdiction with general courts-martial in 
military commissions, provost courts or other military tribunals for offenses that by the law of 
anned conflict may be tried by such commissions or tribunals, GPW, art. 85 provides that paws 
who are prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture 
shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of that Convention. One benefit ofGPW appears in art. 
102 that paws can be validly sentenced only ifsuch sentences have been pronounced by the same 
courts according to the same procedures as in the case of members of the anned forces of the 
Detaining Power. A POW in United States custody would enjoy the same procedural safeguards 
afforded to U.S. anned forces personnel under the UCM] for offenses committed whether before 
or after capture. These provisions seem to preclude future use of the type of military commission 
that tried General Yamashita. See McDougal & Feliciano 730-31. 
82. 1977 Digest of United States Practice in International Law 927; UN Convention on the 
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 26 
Nov. 1968, entered into force 11 Nov. 1970, not in force for the United States, 8 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 
68 (1969). While not opposed to the basic purposes of this convention, the United States voted 
against its adoption because it redefined crimes against humanity in a legally unsatisfactory way and 
had retroactive application in nations in which existing limits had expired. Dep't St. Bull., 17 Feb. 
1969, at 153. Miller, The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 65 Am. ]. Int'l L. 476 (1971) examines the travaux 
preparatoires of this convention. 
83. GPWarts. 82-108, GC, arts. 64-75 & 117-26, GP II, art. 6, and for nations party thereto 
GP I, art. 75. The United States supports "in particular" the fundamental guarantees contained in 
GP I, art. 75, as ones that should be observed and in due course recognized as customary law even if 
they have not already achieved that status. Matheson, Remarks, paragraph 6.1, note 1 (p. 323) at 422 & 
427. 
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provide a fair trial for the alleged conunission of a war crime is itself a war 
. 84 
cnme. 
---------
6.2.5.5 Defenses 
6.2.5.5.1 Superior Orders. The fact that a person conunitted a war crime 
under orders of his military or civilian superior does not relieve him from 
responsibility under international law. It may be considered in mitigation of 
punishment.85 To establish responsibility, the person must know (or have reason 
to know) that an act he is ordered to perform is unlawful under international 
law.86 Such an order must be manift"".dy illegal.87 The standard is whether under 
84. GWS, art. 50; GWS-Sea, art. 51; GPW, art. 130; GC, art. 147; GP I, art. 85(4)(e) (forStates 
party thereto). 
85. See paragraph 6.1.4 (p. 328). The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, art. 8, stated: 
The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a 
superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation 
of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 
U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, 1944-45,255 (1946). 
Despite efforts to include a provision on the defense of superior orders in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, and in GP I, nations could not agree on the balance between military discipline and 
the requirements of humanitarian law, and thus left unchanged the international law on the 
defense of superior orders. Levie, Protection of War Victims: Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions: Supplement (1985), provides the negotiating history of the effort to include a 
provision on the defense of superior orders in GP I. See also Levie, The Rise and Fall of an 
Internationally Codified Denial of the Defense of Superior Orders, 30 Revue De Droit Militaire 
Et De Droit De La Guerre 183 (1991), reprinted in Schmitt & Green at chap. XV. Note that the 
Statute for the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the Statute for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (see paragraph 6.2.5, note 55 (p. 343» provide (in arts. 7(4) & 6(4) 
respectively) the following: 
The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a 
superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in 
anticipation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 
86. The following statement indicates those circumstances in which the plea of superior orders 
may serve as a defense: 
Undoubtedly, a Court confronted with the plea of superior orders adduced in 
justification of a war crime is bound to take into consideration the fact that obedience to 
military orders, not obviously unlawful, is the duty of every member of the armed forces 
and that the latter cannot, in conditions of war discipline, be expected to weigh 
scrupulously the legal merits of the order received; that rules of warfare are often 
controversial; and that an act otherwise amounting to a war crime may have been 
executed in obedience to orders conceived as a measure of reprisals. Such circumstances 
are probably in themselves sufficient to divest the act of the stigma of a war crime. 
2 Oppenheim-Lauterpact 568-69. 
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the same or similar circumstances a person of ordinary sense and understanding 
would know the order to be unlawful. 88 If the person knows the act is unlawful 
and only does it under duress, this circumstance may be taken into consideration 
either by way of defense or in mitigation of punishment. 89 
6.2.5.5.2 Military Necessity. The law of armed conflict provides that only 
that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed 
conflict, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a 
minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources may be applied. This 
principle, often referred to as "military necessity," is a fundamental concept of 
86.( ... continued) 
As to the general attitude taken by military tribunals toward the plea of superior orders, the 
following statement is representative: 
It cannot be questioned that acts done in time of war under the military authority of an 
enemy cannot involve any criminal liability on the part of officers or soldiers if the acts 
are not prohibited by the conventional or customary rules of war. Implicit obedience 
to orders of superior officers is almost indispensable to every military system. But this 
implies obedience to lawful orders only. If the act done pursuant to a superior's orders 
be murder, the production of the order will not make it any less so. It may mitigate but 
it cannot justify the crime. We are of the view, however, that if the illegality of the 
order was not known to the inferior, and he could not reasonably have been expected 
to know of its illegality, no wrongful intent necessary to the commission of a crime 
exists and the interior [sic] will be protected. But the general rule is that members of the 
armed forces are bound to obey only the lawful orders of their commanding officers and 
they cannot escape criminal liability by obeying a command which violates international 
law and outrages fundamental concepts of justice. 
TI,e Hostage Case (United States v. Wilhelm Ust et al.), 11 TWC 1236. 
87. See U.S. v. Calley, 46 CMR 1131, 48 CMR 19 (1969, 1971). UCM], art. 92, requires 
members of the armed forces to obey only lawful orders. An order that directs the commission of a 
crime is a patendy illegal order. Para. 14c(2)(a)(i), Part IV, MCM, 1984. 
88. R.C.M. 916(d); U.S. v. Calley, 48 CMR 29 (opinion of}. Quinn), 30 (concurring opinion 
of]. Duncan); Green, Superior Orders in National and International Law 142 (1976). R.C.M. 
916(d) provides: 
Obedience to orders. It is a defense to any offense that the accused was acting pursuant to 
orders unless the accused knew the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary 
sense and understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful. 
See Green, Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man, inEmys on tbeModemlaw ofWar(l985) at chap. III. 
89. An individual may plead duress if he can establish that he acted only under pain of an 
immediate threat, e.g., the immediate threat of physical coercion, in the event of non compliance 
with the order of a superior. In the judgment of one tribunal, it was declared that: 
[T]here must be a showing of circumstances such that a reasonable man would 
apprehend that he was in such imminent physical peril as to deprive him of freedom 
to choose the right and refrain from the wrong. 
TI,e High Command Case (United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al.), 11 TWC 509. 
(continued ... ) 
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restraint designed to limit the application of force in anned conflict to that which 
is in fact required to carry out a lawful military purpose. Too often it is 
misunderstood and misapplied to support the application of military force that is 
excessive and unlawful under the misapprehension that the "military necessity" 
of mission accomplishment justifies the result. While the principle does 
recognize that some amount of collateral damage and incidental injury to 
civilians and civilian objects may occur in an attack upon a legitimate military 
objective, it does not excuse the wanton destruction of life and progerty 
disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained from the attack.9 
6.2.5.5.3 Acts Legal or Obligatory Under National Law. The fact that 
national law does not prohibit an act which constitutes a war crime under 
international law does not relieve the ferson who committed the act from 
responsibility under internationallaw.9 However, the fact that a war crime 
under intemationallaw is made legal and even obligatory under national law may 
be considered in mitigation of punishment. 92 
89.( ... continued) 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg declared in its judgment that the test of 
responsibility for superior orders "is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was 
in fact possible." 1 Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg 14 November 1945- 1 October 1946, at 224 (1947), excerpted in U.S. Naval War 
College, International Law Documents, 1946-1947, at 260 (1948). 
The following examples illustrate these principles: 
Case 1: The deliberate target selection of a hospital protected under the Geneva 
Conventions for aerial bombardment would be a violation of law. Although the 
person making the selection would be criminally responsible, a pilot given such 
coordinates would not be criminally responsible unless he knew the nature of the 
protected target attacked and that circumstances (e.g., see paragraph 8.5.1.4 (p. 424)) 
did not otherwise justifY the attack. 
Case 2: Faulty intelligence may cause attacks on targets which are not in fact military 
objectives. No criminal responsibility would result in this event unless the attack was 
pursued after the correct intelligence was received and communicated to the 
attacking force. 
Case 3. A naval pilot attacks, admittedly in a negligent manner, and consequendy 
misses his target, a military objective, by several miles. The bombs fall on civilian 
objects unknown to the pilot. No deliberate violation of international law occurred. 
However, he might be subject to possible criminal punishment under his own 
nation's criminal code for dereliction of duty. He could not properly be charged 
with a violation of the law of armed conflict. 
90. See Stone 352; McDougal & Feliciano 72 & 528; FM 27-10, para. 3; Note, Military 
Necessity in War Crimes Trials, 29 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 442 (1953); Greenspan 279; and 3 Hyde 
1801. Compare paragraph 5.2, note 6 (p. 292). See also De Mulinen, Handbook on the Law War 
For Armed Forces (1987) at 352-55. 
91. Principle II, paragraph 6.2.5, note 55 (p. 343); FM 27-10, para. 511. 
92. DA Pam 27-161-2, at 249, and sources cited therein. 
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6.2.5.6 Sanctions. Under international law, any punishment, including the 
death penalty, may be imposed on any person found guilty of a war crime.93 
United States policy requires that the punishment be deterrent in nature and 
proportionate to the gravity of the offense.94 
93. Levie, 2 The Code ofInternational Anned Conflict 907. 
94. FM 27-10, para. 508. For a recent general discussion of issues relating to war crimes trials, 
defenses, and other developments regarding international tribunals, see Albany Law Review 
Annual Symposium: Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in 
International Law, in 60 Albany L. Rev. 565-1079 (1997). 
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ANNEXA6-1 
REPORTABLE VIOLATIONS 
SECNAVIST 3300.1 (series), OPNA VINST 3300.52 (Navy) and MCO 
3300.3 (Marine Corps), require each person in the Department of the Navy who 
has knowledge of or receives a report of an apparent violation of the law of anned 
conflict to make that incident known to his immediate commander, 
commanding officer, or to a superior officer as soon as is practicable, and requires 
commanders and commanding officers receiving reports of noncompliance with 
or breaches of the law of anned conflict to report the facts prompdy to the 
National Military Command Center. The 1949 Geneva Conventions for the 
Protection of War Victims (and the 1977 Protocol I Additional to those 
Conventions for nations bound thereby) proscribe certain acts which are 
commonly accepted as violations of the law of anned conflict. See paragraph 
6.1.2, note 9 (p. 325) and accompanying text. 
The following are examples of those incidents which must be reported: 
1. Offenses against the wounded, sick, survivors of sunken ships, prisoners of 
war, and civilian inhabitants of occupied or allied territories including interned 
and detained civilians: attacking without due cause; willful killing; torture or 
inhuman treatment, including biological, medical or scientific experiments; 
physical mutilation; removal of tissue Or organs for transplantation; any medical 
procedure not indicated by the health of the person and which is not consistent 
with generally accepted medical standards; willfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health or seriously endangering the physical or mental 
health; and taking as hostages. 
2. Other offenses against prisoners of war (POW): compelling a POW to 
serve in the anned forces of the enemy; causing the perfonnance of unhealthy, 
dangerous, or otherwise prohibited labor; infringement of religious rights; and 
deprivation of the right to a fair and regular trial. 
3. Other offenses against survivors of sunken ships, the wounded or sick: 
when military interests do permit, failure to search out, collect, make provision 
for the safety of, or to care for survivors of sunken ships, or to care for members of 
anned forces in the field who are disabled by sickness or wounds or who have laid 
down their arms and surrendered. 
4. Other offenses against civilian inhabitants, including interned and detained 
civilians of, and refugees and stateless persons within, occupied or allied 
territories: unlawful deportation or transfer, unlawful confinement, compelling 
forced labor, compelling the civilian inhabitants to serve in the anned forces of 
the enemy or to participate in military operations, denial of religious rights, 
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denaturalization, infringement of property rights, and denial of a fair and regular 
trial. 
5. Attacks on individual civilians or the civilian population, or indiscriminate 
attacks affecting the civilian population or civilian property, knowing that the 
attacks will cause loss of life , injury to civilians or damage to civilian property that 
would be excessive or disproportionate in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated, and which cause death or serious injury to body 
or health. 
6. Deliberate attacks upon medical transports including hospital ships, coastal 
rescue craft, and their lifeboats or small craft; medical vehicles; medical aircraft; 
medical establishments including hospitals; medical units; medical personnel or 
crews (including shipwrecked survivors); and persons parachuting from aircraft 
in distress during their descent. 
7. Killing or otherwise imposing punishment, without a fair trial, upon spies 
and other persons suspected of hostile acts while such persons are in custody. 
8. Maltreatment or mutilation of dead bodies. 
9. Willful or wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation 
not justified by military necessity; aerial or naval bombardment whose sole 
purpose is to attack and terrorize the civilian population, or to destroy protected 
areas, buildings or objects (such as buildings used for religious, charitable or 
medical purposes, historic monuments or works of art); attacking localities 
which are undefended, open to occupation, and without military significance; 
attacking demilitarized zones contrary to the terms establishing such zones. 
10. Improper use of privileged buildings or localities for military purposes. 
11. Attacks on facilities--such as dams and dikes, which, if destroyed, would 
release forces dangerous to the civilian population-when not justified by 
military necessity. 
12. Pillage or plunder of public or private property. 
13. Willful misuse of the distinctive emblem (red on a white background) of 
the red cross, red crescent or other protective emblems, signs or signals 
recognized under international law. 
14. Feigning an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or surrender; feigning 
incapacitation by wounds or sickness; feigning civilian non-combatant status; 
feigning protected status by use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United 
Nations or a neutral or other nation not a party to the conflict or by wearing 
civilian clothing to conceal military identity during batde. 
15. Firing upon a flag of truce. 
16. Denial of quarter, unless bad faith is reasonably suspected. 
17. Violations of surrender or armistice terms. 
18. Using poisoned or otherwise forbidden arms or ammunition. 
19. Poisoning wells, streams or other water sources. 
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20. Other analogous acts violating the accepted rules regulating the conduct 
of warfare. 
Source: SECNA VINST 3300.1A (series) 
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ANNEXA6-2 
RULES FOR COMBATANTS 
u.S. NAVY 
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF HUMANITARIAN 
LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 
1. Fight only enemy combatants. 
2. Destroy no more than your mission requires. 
3. Do not attack enemy soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines who surrender. 
Disarm them and tum them over to your superior. 
4. Prisoners of war and other detainees shall never be tortured or killed. 
5. Collect and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked survivors, whether 
friend or enemy, on land or at sea. 
6. Medical personnel and chaplains, medical and religious facilities and medical 
transportation are protected. Respect them and do not attack them. 
7. Treat all civilians humanely and respect their property. Do not attack them. 
8. Do your best to prevent any violation of the above rules. Report any 
violations to the appropriate authority promptly. 
9. You cannot be ordered to violate these rules. 
10. Discipline in combat is essential. Disobedience of the law of armed conflict 
dishonors your nation, the Navy, and you. Far from weakening the enemy's will 
to fight, such disobedience strengthens it. Disobedience of the law of armed 
conflict is also a crime punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ). 
Source: OPNAVINST 3300.52 
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U.S. MARINE CORPS 
LAW OF WAR PRINCIPLES 
Discipline in combat is essential. Disobedience to the law of war dishonors the 
Nation, the Marine Corps, and the individual Marine; and far from weakening 
the enemy's will to fight, it strengthens it. The following principles require the 
Marine's adherence in the accomplishment of any mission. Violations have an 
adverse impact on public opinion both national and international and have on 
occasion served to prolong conflict by inciting an opponent to continue 
resistance and in most cases constitute violations of the UCMJ. Violations of 
these principles prejudice the good order and discipline essential to success in 
combat. 
1. Marines fight only enemy combatants. 
2. Marines do not harm enemies who surrender. They must disarm them and 
turn them over to their superior. 
3. Marines do not kill or torture prisoners. 
4. Marines collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe. 
5. Marines do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment. 
6. Marines destroy no more than the mission requires. 
7. Marines treat all civilians humanely. 
8. Marines do not steal. Marines respect private property and possessions. 
9. Marines should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war. They 
must report all violations of the law of war to their superior. 
Source: Marine Corps Institue Order P1500.44C 
